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The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: The Perils
and Promises of Transnational Labor
Solidarity
JAMES ATLESONt
An injury to one is an injury to all.'
If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem.
Sympathy strikes.., are becoming increasingly frequent because
of the move towards the concentration of enterprises, the
globalization of the economy and the delocalization of work
centers. While pointing out that a number of distinctions need to
be drawn here,. .. the [ILO Freedom of Association] Committee
considers that a general prohibition on sympathy strikes could
lead to abuse and that workers should be able to take such action,
provided the initial strike they are supporting is 
itself lawful. 2
t Distinguished Teaching Professor of Law, University at Buffalo. The author
would like to thank Ellen Dannin for her careful comments on an earlier
version of this paper, Alan Hyde, Patrick Macklem, Makoto Ishida, and Guy
Mundlak for their suggestions, and Fred Konefsky for his unfailing support of
this and all other projects. Jason Bowman, Kevin Hsi, John Haberstroh, and
Erin Sobkowski provided valuable research assistance. Generous assistance
was provided by the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy and by Dean Nils
Olsen.
Versions of this effort were presented in a number of forums including the
1999 Intell Conference, Cape Town, South Africa; the 1998 Law and Society
Conference, Chicago, Illinois; and the 1999 Labor Law Group Conference,
Scottsdale, Arizona. Short versions of this paper have been published as James
Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: Transnational Labour Solidarity and
the Obstacles of Domestic Law, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 379
(Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002) and James Atleson, "An Injury to one...".
in TRANSNATIONAL LABOR SOLIDARITY AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LAw 160
(James A. Gross ed., 2003).
1. INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD CONST. PMBL., at http://pdx.iww.org/
preamble.html.
2. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 74 (1994) [hereinafter FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION].
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INTRODUCTION
This work is based on three propositions. First, that
fairness-or rights-at work is critical to the functioning of
a viable democracy. Senator Robert Wagner argued
strenuously in the 1930s that fairness, participatory rights,
and representation at work were critical if Americans were
to take their political rights seriously. At a time when many
argue that Americans have little interest in political
participation, this connection may need to be remembered.
Second, and closely related, is the notion that labor
rights are human rights, although labor advocates and
human rights specialists have not had much to do with each
other until recently. That is, these rights are important
totally separate from their functional use for creating
independent power centers or for cementing political
democracy. Human rights advocates have been
understandably concerned about serious threats to health
and safety as well as the suppression of democratic rights.
Except for, perhaps, discrimination, the plight of workers as
workers has not been a critical issue. Yet both labor and
human rights stem from international documents. Labor
rights are set out not only in International Labor
Organization ("ILO") conventions and recommendations but
also in UN documents such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.3
Third, the recognition and protection of collective action
is critical to the advancement of many kinds of rights,
especially work-related rights. These rights are generally
stated in individual terms, but all have a collective
dimension. Many rights are meaningful only when
exercised in a collective manner or, at least, can only be
effectively achieved, recognized, and enforced in a collective
manner.
Global forces are making it more rational for workers to
engage in cross-border sympathetic action. The
3. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GOAR,
3d Sess., Pt. 1, at 71, art. 20(1), art. 23(4), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Int'l
Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 22;
Int'l Covenant on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3, art. 8.
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transnational aspect of capital, including the cross-border
mergers that are occurring, will mean that labor disputes in
one country will be of concern to workers in another, even if
they are not employed by the same firm. Indeed, a good deal
of cooperative activity already exists.4 Much of this type of
activity, however, will be unlawful, but this will not be the
first time that rational strike activity occurred in the face of
hostile law. Thus, the use of collective action will often
involve the expression of a right-not because one is
entitled to it and not because there is a remedy for its
violation.
The increasingly global nature of our economy has led
many to consider whether labor rights could or should be
deemed international human rights. The idea that all
citizens of the world possess basic rights has gained
currency in recent years, and it is certainly reasonable to
argue that the workplace, the location in which people
spend most of their lives, should not be exempted. Indeed,
various international conventions and documents do indeed
set forth specific workplace rights, and unions may be able
to expand or enforce those rights by their own efforts.
Separate from the notion that labor rights are human
rights, the recognition and protection of worker solidarity is
fundamental to the law of many nations. Recently, some
have advocated a return to notions of workplace equity and
industrial democracy, ideas embedded in the labor
legislation of many nations.5 In the United States, for
4. A Lexis/Nexis search in October, 2001, for instance, revealed numerous
strikes or threatened work stoppages within and across borders. Eight
thousand members of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, for
instance, threatened to strike in solidarity with aluminum workers in
Mozambique. See Irene Louw, Numsa Digs in Heels Over Auto Strike Sympathy
Action Expected This Week, Bus. DAY (S. Afr.), Aug. 13, 2001, at 2. Workers of
various airlines at the Dublin airport threatened to walk off the job in
sympathy with striking British Midland workers. See Padraig Yates, One Hour
Strike Could Shut Dublin Airport, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at 6; see also
Padraig Yates, British Midland Staff End Strike, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at
4. The Korean Transport Workers Federation boycotted logs in sympathy with
New Zealand workers. See Korean Boycott 'Threat to NZ's Reputation,'
DOMINION (Wellington), Jan. 4, 2001, at 2. Sympathy strikes totally within
countries occurred in South Africa and Korea. See, e.g., Major Auto Strike Hits
South Korea, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2000, at 2; Louw, supra, at 3. Additional
examples will be discussed subsequently.
5. See generally James Gross, A Human Rights Perspective on United States
Labor Relations Law: A Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association, 3
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 65 (1999); see also Lance Compa, UNFAIR
2004]
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instance, the concept of solidarity is embodied in the
National Labor Relations Act's definition of "employee"
which expressly extends beyond the boundaries of any
individual employer. If worker solidarity is important to
advance shared goals within one country, the increasingly
global nature of work and the mobility of capital suggest
that it is essential that worker solidarity exist across
national boundaries. After all, the rise of transnational
corporations makes it likely that in some instances worker
solidarity efforts across national boundaries could be within
the confines of one employer.
This concern forms the initial idea of this work, an
endeavor that also involves comparative and domestic labor
law and the problem that legal rules often create serious
obstacles to expressions of transnational labor solidarity.
Labor unions are beginning to consider how they can take
part in the world market and engage in actions that aid
fellow workers elsewhere in the world.6 The interest in
solidarity is motivated by the effects of globalization and
international economic forces that perhaps affect workers
more than nations. As defined by the ILO, globalization
refers to the "worldwide wave of liberalization of trade,
investment and capital flows and the consequent growing
importance of these flows and of international competition
in the world economy."
7
I. LABOR AND INTERNATIONALISM
Labor lawyers and unions, at least in the United States,
have thus far not stressed international labor rights, and
international human rights groups have not focused on
ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 40-50 (2000). For a variety of views
of the relationship of labor rights to human rights, see essays in WORKER
RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (James Gross ed., 2003).
6. There is a clear parallel to the criminal conspiracy cases in the United
States which also dealt with whether unions were legitimate players in the
market. See Robert Steinfeld, The Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case of 1806: The
Struggle Over Alternative Legal Constructions of a Free Market in Labor, in
LABOR LAW IN AMERICA (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992).
7. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE GENEVA, WORLD LABOUR REPORT:
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL STABILITY 1997-98 37-44 (1997)
[hereinafter WORLD LABOUR REPORT 1997-98].
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labor rights, at least collective rights.8 Recently, however,
the concern for internationalism unions voiced in the late
19th and early 20th centuries has returned,9 although most
of it has focused on attaching some recognition of minimum
standards to trade pacts. i Whatever one thinks of the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
("NAALC"), the side agreement added to NAFTA because of
union pressure on then candidate Bill Clinton, it has, in a
weak way, provided a forum for raising labor rights issues.
In a number of cases, unions and non-governmental
organizations ("NGO's") have filed submissions arguing
that other NAFTA signatories have failed to enforce their
8. Virginia Leary, The Paradox of Workers' Rights as Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22 (Lance A. Compa
& Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
The leading North American advocate for treating labor rights as human
rights is Roy Adams. Adams has organized SPHRE, an international
organization to promote labor and human rights. A number of Adams's papers
are available online at www.business.mcmaster.ca/hrlr/profs/adamsr/index.htm.
See also Roy J. Adams, Collective Bargaining: The Rodney Dangerfield of
Human Rights, 50 LAB. L.J. 204 (1999). For a growing recognition of the
application of human rights to labor, see Eyal Press, Human Rights: The Next
Step, NATION, Dec. 25, 2000, at 13.
9. Between 1890 and 1914, Daniel Rodgers notes, labor politics had a
decidedly international tone.
From the American Knights of Labor organizers canvassing for recruits
in the English midlands in the 1880s to the British and American
fraternal delegates trading places at their respective annual labor
union gatherings to the work of Marx's successors and the Second
Socialist International, there was no missing the sharply conscious
international edge to labor politics.
DANIEL RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE
52 (1988). For a brief summary of international collaboration by unions and
workers, see Michael Gordon & Lowell Turner, Going Global, in TRANSNATIONAL
COOPERATION AMONG LABOR UNIONS 1, 16-22 (Michael E. Gordon & Lowell
Turner eds., 2000).
For the possibilities of labor internationalism in the mid-1940s, see
VICTOR SILVERMAN, IMAGINING INTERNATIONALISM IN AMERICAN AND BRITISH
LABOR, 1939-1949 (2000).
10. Even world business leaders have agreed to promote human rights,
improve labor conditions, and protect the environment in conjunction with the
global compact proposed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The pact was signed
by representatives of the International Chamber of Commerce and the
International Organization of Employers. See ICC Bus. WORLD World Business
Responds to Kofi Annan's Challenge on Shared Goals with the U.N. (July 5,
1999), at www.iccwbo.org/hom/newsarchives/1999/worldbusiness- responds
_to-annanchallenge.asp.
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own domestic law. Although it might have been assumed
that most cases would involve complaints to the U.S.
National Administrative Office that Mexico was failing to
abide by the terms of the labor side agreement, a number of
cases have been filed by Mexican unions complaining about
the failure of the United States to enforce its own law.
In recent years, the subject of international trade has
tended to dominate any assertion or discussion of
international labor rights. The creation of new trading
blocks and, especially, the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), have moved the possible linkage of worker rights
and trade to the front page. Unions, and some developed
nations, have argued that a natural connection exists.
Moreover, if freer trade increases jobs, as, for instance, the
"Washington Consensus" propounds, then the opposite
must be true for imports. Between 1990 and 1995 in the
United States, for instance, the value of exports more than
doubled, but this number was exceeded by imports that
tripled, thereby eliminating more jobs than those created by
the increase in exports. 2 Nevertheless, there are serious
doubts whether trade agreements can be a likely, let alone
11. Moreover, the earlier U.S. Generalized System of Preferences permitted
the United States to unilaterally apply trade pressure against a number of
small countries to accord modest levels of labor rights. Lance Compa, Going
Multilateral, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 337 (1995); Philip Alston, Labor Rights
Provisions in U.S. Trade Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 71 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
Actually, there is something faintly humorous about U.S. unions filing
submissions with the U.S. National Administrative Organization complaining
that Mexico does not effectively protect strikers, that Mexican law is not
effectively enforced, and that procedures take too long. Similar objections have
long been raised about U.S. labor law.
The United States's post-NAFTA trade agreements with Chile, Jordan, and
Singapore obliges signatories to not only to reaffirm their obligations as ILO
members and their commitments pursuant to the ILO's Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, but also to ensure that
international labor principles are "recognized and protected by domestic law."
The principles listed are freedom of association, the right to organize and
bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced or compulsory labor and the
protection of children. Discrimination, one of the four fundamental principles of
the Declaration, is not listed. See K.D. Ewing, Bilateral Trade Agreements and
Labour Standards: Initiatives from the U.S., 10 INT'L UNION RTS. 12 (2003); see
also Marley Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back-or Vice Versa: Labor
Rights Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile,
to Latin America, and Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 689 (2003).
12. See, e.g., DONALD BARLETT AND JAMES STEELE, AMERICA: WHO STOLE THE
DREAM? 39 (1996).
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an effective, vehicle for the promotion of international labor
rights.13 Clearly, worker interests cannot be divorced from
trade, and not only because of the "race to the bottom"
argument. The restriction of worker rights affects one
nation's trade advantage just as do subsidies to domestic
manufacturers or import duties. Indeed, laws that fail to
provide minimum labor standards, a decent or even
subsistence level minimum wage, or which provide
obstacles to union organization create a domestic trade
advantage, discriminating against those nations that do set
minimum wages or accord association rights consistent
with ILO standards.
14
The WTO, however, has greatly restricted a nation's
ability to implement or enforce provisions for worker
protection. Thus, a nation cannot, consistent with WTO
standards, set labor or environmental standards which the
WTO determines masks an intent to protect domestic
industries. Nor may a nation bar the import of goods made
in conditions it feels violate its own norms or standards, for
instance, goods made by young children or produced in
unsafe or unhealthy conditions. (The one exception is goods
made by forced labor, which has led to a recent federal
statute barring such goods from the United States
market.)15 Even if a state internally bars the manufacture
and transport of goods made, for instance, by children
under a specific age, it may not bar such goods made
13. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon: Local Laborers in a
Global Labor Market, 94 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. LAw 93 (1999); Adelle
Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty
Interpretation, 31 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1 (1999).
14. Brian Langille, General Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and
Labor (Or: Fair Trade is Free Trade's Destiny), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE 231 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996); Virginia Leary, Workers' Rights and International
Trade: The Social Clause, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES
FOR FREE TRADE 177 (Jagdash Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
15. WTO rules generally prohibit a state from distinguishing among non-
product related Production and Processing Methods ("PPMs"). LORI WALLACH &
MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION
AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY 174 (1999). In other words, states are barred
from treating products differently on the basis of the way they are produced as
opposed to their physical qualities or end uses. In addition, a WTO nation
cannot treat another differently based on its labor, human rights or
environment standards. Finally, governments themselves are barred from using
noncommercial considerations when making government-purchasing decisions.
Id.
2004]
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elsewhere despite the effect on its own labor standards. 6
Current WTO rules, in short, provide significant barriers to
state-based methods for the protection of human rights."
The WTO could consider and adopt some kind of social
clause, but this does not appear to be a likely possibility,
despite the curious efforts in this direction by the United
States. The role of the United States may seem "curious"
because the United States has been reticent to sign on to
the vast majority of ILO documents. The United States has
approved only seven ILO documents, placing near the
bottom of nations affirming international labor rights
documents. Although the effort to use the WTO to establish
international labor standards is continuing, adoption of a
"social clause" in this body dominated by "free traders" and
populated by third world governments, unions, and
employers who perceive such efforts as limitations on their
economic success, seems unlikely. 8 The developing world's
16. Interestingly, a similar argument was made in support of the first U.S.
effort to bar the interstate transport of goods made by child labor. Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
For a spirited argument that the WTO and pre-WTO GATT panels have
misinterpreted GATT Article XX, ignoring the extent to which nations are
permitted to act to protect international human rights, see ROBERT HOWSE &
MAKAU MUTUA, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES
FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 11-17 (2000).
17. For an argument that the United States should act unilaterally to
protect labor rights, see Jerome Levinson, Certifying International Worker
Rights: A Practical Alternative, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POLY J. 401 (1999).
The asserted lack of reasonable connection between trade and labor rights is
a sign of the importance of historical context as well as an indication of the
success of neo-liberal ideas. The original vision of a post-war international
economic order involved three institutions: the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the International Trade Organization. The latter,
negotiated in Havana in 1948 and signed by fifty-three nations, including
developing countries, explicitly promoted labor rights. Indeed, the labor rights
provision was strongly promoted by developing countries. The ITO's Havana
Charter included sanctions for countries that did not pursue full employment
policies, and it was designed to provide "all countries with a way to adapt and
adjust to competitive pressures without having to sacrifice equity and social
justice." However, the opposition of American business interests seriously
threatened ratification by the Senate, and President Truman did not present
the treaty to the body. The result was the death of the ITO and its replacement
by GATT which eventually led to the WTO. See Mark Levinson, Trading Places:
Globalization from the Bottom Up, NEW LAB. F. 23, 27-28 nn.3-9 (2002).
18. Harry Arthurs, The Collective Labour Law of a Global Economy, in
LABOUR LAW AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 148 (Chris Engels & Manfred Weiss
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Arthurs, Collective Labour Law].
NEPTUNE JADE
political leaders often are opposed, seeing international
labor standards as a threat to their competitive advantage
or afraid of respecting these standards due to the pressures
of international trade competition. Although no nation may
be an island, labor is deemed localized. Moreover, efforts to
interfere with or to regulate the allegedly "free market" are
routinely attacked as paternalistic or inconsistent with
deeply held views. The current hegemony and acceptance of
these views makes it difficult to raise claims based upon
what may be seen as "weak" arguments based on human
dignity, democratic values, justice, and worker rights.
The opposition of developing nations, when combined
with the free traders and those extending the notion of
"comparative advantage," makes for a powerful force. Yet,
the latter notion takes no account of social policy or values
other than narrow economic ones. The views of David
Ricardo, after all, were based not only on a quite different
world but also on exploitation of natural resources. 9 The
comparative advantage of low-wage workers when they are
children or when their attempts at unionization are crushed
presents a quite different situation. The concern is not with
comparative advantage as such but, rather, with
comparative exploitation. The exploited can rarely be
expected to raise "free market," anti-regulation, limited
government or sneaking imperialism arguments in
response to notions of international labor rights.
In addition, we are generally not dealing with a nation's
use of its workers but, usually, employment by
transnational enterprises ("TNEs"), who may seek locales
where, for instance, labor organization is not expected
because of state opposition. Many developing nations, like
southern states in the United States, advertise their "labor
free" environment. Yet, if the focus is the opposition of the
developing nations, one must ask who precisely these elites
19. For an excellent critique of comparative advantage, see Clyde Summers,
The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 61, 65 (2001). Summers notes that even without the battle in
the streets the conference might well have broken up if the United States had
been serious about "studying" the issue of attaching labor rights to the WTO.
Summers also notes that developing nations might oppose the introduction of
labor rights because, although the "core" rights do not involve labor costs, the
organization of workers into unions could raise wages. Moreover, unions
historically represent another power center in society, often opposed to
entrenched wealth and power and asserting broad social and political values.
20041
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represent and whether workers and unions in countries
such as Malaysia or Thailand have the same view of
international labor standards."
Apart from efforts to tie international labor rights with
trade arrangements, the ILO can be looked to for standards.
Yet, as Harry Arthurs has noted, "it does not claim to
provide, in any true sense, a transnational forum with a
mandate to evaluate the conduct of individual companies
and unions."21 ILO standards are promoted by public
pressure and, hopefully, embarrassment, as the ILO has no
enforcement mechanisms and cannot even expel offending
members.22 To build on the ILO's efforts, some mechanism
20. The views of developing countries should not be interpreted to mean
that all in those countries share those views. For instance, a recent study
indicates that an overwhelming majority of union leaders in these nations favor
the linking of international trade and international labor rights. See Gerard
Griffen et al., Trade Unions and the Trade-Labour Rights Link: A North-South
Union Divide?, 19 INT'L J. COMP. LAB. & INDUS. REL. 469 (2003).
21. Arthurs, Collective Labour Law, supra note 18, at 145.
22. ILO pressure has resulted in some successes. See, e.g., Lee Swepston,
Human Rights Law and Freedom of Association: Development Through ILO
Supervision, 137 INT'L LAB. REV. 169,174-194 (1998); Geraldo von Potobsky,
Freedom of Association: The Impact of Convention No. 87 and ILO Action, 137
INT'L LAB. REV. 195 (1998).
The ILO has some undefined, and generally unused, authority to enforce its
standards. Article 33 of the ILO's Constitution grants broad authority to
respond to countries that are not in compliance with the obligations of
membership: "[Tihe Governing Body may recommend that the Conference take
such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith."
Article 33 was first invoked in 2000 against Burma. Following a complaint
against Burma under Article 26, a Commission of Inquiry ultimately called on
Burma to bring its laws and practices into compliance. After no response was
received from Burma, the Conference approved a resolution that condemned
Burma's refusal to comply with the Commission of Inquiry's recommendations,
prohibited technical assistance except as necessary to implement the
recommendations, and banned Burma from most meetings. In March 2000 the
Governing Body requested member states to take appropriate measures with
the Government of Myanmar [Burma] in relation to Burma's use of forced labor.
The situation has not changed, at least formally, nor is it clear that the call for
member action has had any effect. As Elliott and Freeman note, the ILO's
"slow and tortuous response to Burmese intransigence underscores the
unwillingness of the ILO membership to punish miscreants, even when the
country in question is a small, poor, isolated one whose violations are egregious
and well documented." Kimberly Elliott & Richard Freeman, CAN LABOR
STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? (2003).
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is necessary to make global firms, rather than states alone,
responsible under ILO procedures.23
Furthermore, the procedures of multi-state
arrangements such as the NAFTA labor side agreement
(the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation),
although perhaps useful for publicizing disputes and the
lack of enforcement of domestic labor law, will be unlikely
to advance or regulate collective bargaining relationships
internationally. Even its proponents make the most claims
thus far. Finally, while private efforts to create, for
instance, corporate codes of responsibility show some
promise, it seems that, as Harry Arthurs asserts, "across
the global economy, and even within its most advanced
regional economic systems, all collective labor relations
regimes are essentially local regimes, even when they
involve transnational corporations. 24
Thus, despite the history of attempts to set
international standards for labor and employment, legal
regimes are intensely local in character. As Lord
Wedderburn noted, "one is struck by the contrast between
the facility of the internationalization of capital and the
obstacles that obstruct international trade union action.
Capital is not tied, but each trade union movement is tied
to the particular social history of the country in which it
operates.2 ' Although labor law is basically national just as
labor is still primarily based nationally, Lord Wedderburn's
comments in 1973 are still valid:
23. Keith Ewing argues that the "rubicon" has already been crossed in the
ILO's Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises. See K.D. EWING,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION RIGHTS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 31-33 (2000);
Keith Ewing, Trade Union Rights in the Twenty-first Century, 5 WORING USA,
19, 32-33 (2001).
24. Arthurs, Collective Labour Law, supra note 18, at 151; see also Harry
Arthurs, Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the Global Economy:
Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation, in
LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND
POSSIBILITIES 471 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds 2002); Bob Hepple, A Race to the
Top? International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 20
COMP. LAB. L. & POLY J. 347 (1999); Lance A. Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe
Darricarrere, Private Labor Rights Enforcement Through Corporate Codes of
Conduct, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 181
(Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond, eds., 1966); Van Wezel Stone, supra
note 13, at 123-1288 (1999).
25. K.W. Wedderburn, Industrial Relations, in NATIONALISM AND THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 244, 249 (H.R. Hahlo et al. eds., 1973).
2004]
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The true correlative to an international agreement securing to
capital the right to move and, therefore, organize across the
boundaries of national states would be an agreement securing to
collective organisations of workpeople the right to take common
action in negotiating, bargaining with and, if need be, striking
against the multinational enterprises.... It is not free movement
of labour but free international trade union action which is the
true counterpart to free movement of capital.26
Attempts to forge international relationships among
workers or to take action across borders will naturally
involve national labor law systems. As the following
discussion will reveal, a focus on domestic legal regimes will
often reveal serious difficulties for unions who wish to
promote international standards or the notion that labor
rights should be treated as human rights. The "hollowed
out state" turns out to be not so hollow after all. Just as
many argue that states, far from ceasing to effectively
function in the global world, actually legislate the rules and
structure of the global economy, states regulate the freedom
of workers within their borders to exert economic pressure.
The focus of this Article is the secondary or sympathy
labor boycott. A secondary boycott is generally defined as
economic pressure directed against an employer, often
treated as neutral in the labor dispute, to induce it to cease
doing business with the primary employer or, alternatively,
inducing the employees of those employers not to perform
work that would aid the primary employer's business.
Pressure by those "neutral" employees to aid workers
elsewhere is referred to as sympathetic pressure. A third
form of secondary action would involve pressure directed
against a neutral employer through its customers rather
than through its own employees, that is, causing economic
pressure through a consumer boycott.
Importantly, secondary pressure is often a defensive
rather than an offensive weapon. There is generally no need
to even consider such action if a struck employer ceases
production when struck. Secondary pressure is generally
designed to counter an employer's efforts to continue
production and offset the effect of the strike by using strike
replacements. Where strike replacements are legal, as in
the United States, secondary pressure seems a rational type
26. Id. at 256.
[Vol. 52
NEPTUNE JADE
of pressure, and legal prohibition denies unions an effective
countermove to the use of strike replacements. 27 There is no
question that workers can normally aid workers elsewhere
with verbal or even financial assistance. When workers
strike to aid workers elsewhere, however, the potential for
legal prohibition rises just as the potential for union
strength and effectiveness might well increase.
This, then, is a look at law from the ground up. Formal
labor law, like other types of regulation, often looks
different at the level it is applied, sometimes having greater
effect than a sober reflection on the actual sanctions would
suggest, sometimes having less effect than legislators
hoped. Moreover, the ability to engage in acts of
transnational labor solidarity is obviously limited to
workers, primarily organized workers, who are in a position
to exert economic pressure. Depending upon the nature of
the work involved and the relative strength of the parties,
sympathy actions may be highly effective or virtually
impossible. In this sense, this article deals with a limited
group of workers.
Yet transnational activity is clearly occurring, and its
incidence seems to be growing. Indeed, for a number of
reasons the increase in transnational labor actions can be
rationally predicted. First, sympathetic or secondary
pressure may often appear reasonable as more and more
workers, despite their nationality and location, work for the
same global firm. Second, even if not employed by the same
firm, many workers will be affected directly or indirectly by
labor conditions elsewhere. Third, the rationality of such
action may overcome the likelihood in many countries that
such actions will be deemed unlawful. Indeed, the relevant
law is often unclear and rationales shaky in this area,
although union success may not be promising in many
nations. Historically, however, labor law has often changed
when workers have asserted rights they believed they
possessed, and pressure often alters prevailing
understandings. This Article deals with the ability of
workers to counteract capital, and many examples exist of
such efforts. Finally, these cases of international action may
27. Secondary pressure may also be used to strengthen a union's efforts in
collective bargaining.
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represent an ironic example of the unintended effect of
international capital strategies.28
II. LABOR RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL LABOR SOLIDARITY
Another avenue for promoting labor rights, one in
which promising steps have already been taken, is the
promotion of international labor rights through collective
labor action. Concededly, there are great difficulties, not the
least of which are obstacles to such action posed by
domestic legal regimes. It is true that ILO Conventions
include powerful statements concerning the right of
freedom of assembly, the right to join unions and engage in
collective bargaining, and the prohibition of child and forced
labor and race and sex discrimination.29 Yet, most American
labor lawyers, I am fairly certain, have not read, or perhaps
even heard of, ILO standards, let alone the relevant UN
documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. This would no doubt not apply to
lawyers abroad, who are generally much more attuned to
international and comparative developments. Outside the
United States, international documents and, indeed,
decisions of foreign courts, are often known and even cited
in briefs. Harold Dunning, formerly Chief of Workers'
Relations in the ILO, has said that "[iut would be all but
impossible to find any trade union office in the world where
Convention No. 87 is not only well known but also held in
28. Labor history reveals a series of attempts by owners to control workers
and worker responses, often revealing unintended results. Thus, if factories in
the 19th century were, at least in part, aimed at controlling workers better than
the use of home workers (the "putting out system"), it had the effect of putting
together many workers who could communicate their common interests. One
more modern example is the "just in time" production system which, although
not primarily introduced as a worker control device, has proven to be somewhat
of a gift to unions.
29. See, e.g., Eddy Lee, Globalization and Labour Standards: A Review of
Issues," 136 INT'L LAB. REV. 467 (1997); Nicolas Valticos, International Labour
Standards and Human Rights: Approaching the Year 2000, 137 INT'L LAB. REV.
135 (1998); Breen Creighton, The Internationalsation of Labour Law, in
REDEFINING LABOUR LAW: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF TEACHING AND
RESEARCH 90, 95-109 (Richard Mitchell ed., 1995).
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high esteem., 30 It would be difficult, however, to make the
same assumption about unions and their lawyers in the
United States.
Even if these documents were more widely known, it is
less than certain they would have any impact on promoting
worker rights. It is sobering that even lawyers who
regularly engage in transnational legal practice have little
faith in the value of international legal norms. Harry
Arthurs found in interviews with forty lawyers who
represent transnational firms in seven countries that none
of them believed that international legal norms had much
effect on their advice to clients or in litigation, either
because national norms already exceeded those decreed
internationally, or because labor lawyers knew little about
international law. ILO conventions and codes of conduct
seem not to have arisen in their practice.3' Others may
believe that the ILO, while useful in setting standards, can
be ignored because it has little ability to enforce those
standards.
If trade agreements or the ILO documents provide thin
support for the advancement of labor, where else might
labor turn? The very forces of globalization may make it
unlikely that domestic law can be relied on to advance
worker rights and conditions when domestic law has been
under assault by economic forces as well as organizations
such as the IMF and World Bank.32 Nations cannot be
insulated from global forces, and the labor law system of all
nations will be affected by forces outside national control
and, perhaps, outside the control of the participants.33 As
Christopher Arup has noted, the state may find that it has
limited range of options in relation to regulating global
production.
30. Introduction: Labour Rights, Human Rights, 137 INT'L LAB. REV. 130
(1998).
31. Harry Arthurs, The Role of Global Law Firms in Constructing or
Obstructing A Transnational Regime of Labour Law (1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
32. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four
Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987 (1995).
33. Creighton, supra note 29, at 92-95. For a discussion of the effect of
globalization on the workers of South Africa, see Sakhela Buhlungu, The
Paradox of Victory: South Africa's Union Movement in Crisis, NEW LAB. F. 67
(2001).
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For example, as a host site, it may become reluctant to insist upon
high labor standards within its own territory, for fear of making
local products noncompetitive and risking disinvestment and
capital switching to more sympathetic regulatory environments by
cost-conscious employers. As a home base for multinationals which
source production off-shore, it may be reluctant to extend the
reach of high labor standards beyond its territory, for fear of losing
the commercial advantages of local domiciling and
headquartering.3 4
Thus, labor may have to rely on the possibility of self-
help, directed internationally.
As Robert W. Cox has stated, the notion that states
often acted as agents of employers was slowly replaced with
the "realization of the potential of the state as an
instrument to achieve labor's goals," notions that were
reinforced by the Great Depression, the acceptance of
Keynesian economics, and, more recently, attempts to forge
national income policies through national planning bodies.35
Since the nineteenth century unions have attempted to gain
control over the supply of labor, and their ideology stressed
the international solidarity of workers.
The idea of international labor solidarity was
sidetracked for some time by the Cold War, but the postwar
growth of multinational firms rekindled an international
vision. As Burton Bendiner has noted:
[i]n the past companies looked mainly overseas to assure
themselves of a continuous flow of needed raw materials. With the
stabilization of post-war Europe there were now greater incentives
for direct investment abroad by these American corporations,
which sought to promote their growth through the opening of new
markets. It was advantageous to invest in the construction and
operation of new subsidiary plants which would be an on-the-spot
source of supply for the local areas rather than of exports.
The creation of the European Common Market induced
European manufacturers to expand their operations abroad
as well.
34. Christopher Arup, Labour Market Regulation as a Focus for a Labour
Law Discipline, in REDEFINING LABOUR LAW: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE
OF TEACHING AND RESEARCH 29, 51 (Richard Mitchell ed., 1995).
35. Robert W. Cox, Labor and Transnational Relations, 25 INT'L ORG. 554,
558 (1971).
36. BURTON BENDINER, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR AFFAIRS 5 (1987).
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Although companies rely upon a variety of considerations to
explain foreign expansion, union leaders tend to assert that
the primary motive is the search for lower labor costs. Even
though most foreign investment by TNEs has been directed
to developed nations, for instance Western Europe, such
investment has nevertheless created serious problems for
unions. What is an advantage for one group of workers may
obviously be a disadvantage for another, and international
tensions among national unions have been engendered by
firms which "consider" a variety of locations for new
investment. As nations bid for a new plant, the result is
considerable conflict among various national unions." The
most serious problem, however,
is the arbitrary and unilateral decisions made by the central
administration at the highest level, often thousands of miles away,
vitally affecting the employment and livelihood of workers in the
overseas plants. Specifically these would cover decisions to
transfer operations from one plant to another in a different
country or to terminate production in one factory and open a new
one somewhere else with resulting job losses or gains in various
38
areas.
Moreover, it is often argued currently that corporations
are able to move or threaten to move existing facilities to
other locales. Instead of moving or locating plants to gain
market advantage, to save on transportation costs for
instance, plants can now more easily move to gain labor
advantage, that is, a supply of low paid labor, often
restricted by less than democratic regimes. Surprisingly,
this proposition is challenged by a number of economists,
3
yet firms like Levi-Strauss, Trico, and others commonly
explain international transfers of operations in terms of
relative wage costs. Moreover, as Gordon and Turner note,
"most of the foreign investment in developing countries is
aimed at cutting production costs rather than at expanding
37. Id. at 21-25.
38. Id. at 24.
39. A recent study of U.S. foreign direct investment suggests that
multinational firms do not prefer low skill, low cost economies in which to
create operations. The greatest amount of U.S. foreign direct investment goes to
developed economies such as France, Germany, and Holland with their high
levels of regulation and collective bargaining. William N. Cooke & Deborah S.
Noble, Industrial Relations Systems and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment
Abroad, 36 BRIT. J. INT'L REL. 581 (1998).
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product markets. Developing countries became competitive
in world markets because of their relatively low wage
structure, once they had imported sufficient capital and
technology to protect and grow their industrial sectors." °
Using the geographer's terminology, Jefferson Cowie
notes that capital, unlike labor, has
far greater ability... to transcend and use space; the cognitive
geographies of the two groups were formed under different
circumstances and for different purposes. Management is able to
manipulate distance to fragment labor's collective power, and the
countless variations in the economic topography offer unlimited
terrain for corporations to seek out less costly labor or less
aggressive working-class communities. By relocating, the
corporation can peel back the layers of historical change
accumulated at the old site. It can nurture and reinforce social and
political tendencies of the local scene, or it can punish them by
moving capital out of the area. Command of spatial relations,
therefore, becomes a crucial weapon in management's arsenal, and
its mobility increases the return on investment and holsters its
ability to contend with competition. 4'
The search for labor cost advantage is hardly new,
however, and can take place even without crossing national
borders. Nineteenth century New England manufacturers
of textiles and shoes, for instance, moved south, gaining the
advantage of friendlier environs and, not incidentally, a
cheaper labor force. Similarly, as Cowie has demonstrated,
firms like RCA have moved within and without the United
States to gain cheaper labor and, in addition, to avoid
growing demands of workers in existing locations. 2 Indeed,
a good deal of what is loosely referred to as "globalization"
is not new at all, but the continuation of capital's search for
greater profits and power. The "cheaper" labor force sought
very often involves young, unmarried women. In the
maquiladoras of Mexico or factories in other parts of the
developing world, like many firms in history, usually
explain that women are ideally suited for electronics or
garment work. They are, it is said, more productive and,
40. Michael Gordon & Lowell Turner, Going Global, in TRANSNATIONAL
COOPERATION AMONG LABOR UNIONS 3, 9 (Michael Gordon & Lowell Turner eds.,
2000).
41. JEFFERSON COWIE, CAPITAL MovEs: RCA's 70-YEAR QUEST FOR CHEAP
LABOR 185 (1999).
42. Id. at 185.
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most important, have "nimble fingers" and greater dexterity
than men.43 Nevertheless, the lessening of tariff barriers
and greater ease of communication and travel sharpen the
perception that the search for cheaper labor has sped up
and, in any case, the perception creates tensions between
unions in different nations that make coordinated efforts
that much more difficult.
It is sometimes argued by neo-liberal economists that
globalization and free trade will lead wage rates in
developed and developing countries to converge due to
migration and the free flow of capital and goods. Like all of
these theories, there are some practical problems. First,
and simply, labor does not move freely and most states
attempt to exert control over their borders. But there is a
factual problem as well. Divergence, not convergence, seems
to be occurring. Thus, between 1960 and 1990, income in
Organization for Economic Development ("OECD")
countries grew on average by 2.6% while income in other
states grew only 1.8%. Moreover, the gap in income is
growing, not lessening. The UN's 1996 Human
Development Report estimated that between 1960 and 1991
the share of global income of the richest fifth of the
population rose from 70% to 85% while that of the poorest
declined from 2.3% to 1.4%. In fact, Peter Stalker has
stated that OECD countries have been "converging among
themselves, while diverging with the rest of the world.""
Indeed, considering the percentage of world trade and
foreign direct investment, developing nations are worse off
than they were twenty years ago.
The multinational corporate structure creates problems
both of public and private democratic governance. Unions
as well as nations find themselves dealing increasingly with
corporations that "can more easily weather economic
43. Id. at 18-19, 118-20; see also Laura Ho et al., (Dis)Assembling Rights of
Women Workers Along the Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the
Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C. R. - C. L. L. REV. 383 (1996); Diane L. Wolf,
Linking Women's Labor with the Global Economy: Factory Workers and their
Families in Rural Java, in Kathryn Ward, WOMEN WORKERS AND GLOBAL
RESTRUCTURING 25 (Kathryn Ward ed., 1990); Cecilia Green, At the Junction of
the Global and the Local: Transnational Industry and Women Workers in the
Caribbean, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 118
(Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
44. PETER STALKER, WORKERS WITHOUT FRONTIERS 17 (2000).
45. Id. at 139.
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struggles, conceal information, and transfer, or more
credibly threaten to transfer, work to other locales [sic] or,
indeed, other countries, than could their predecessor
counterparts. For unions, which are organized nationally,
the likelihood that corporate decisions are made elsewhere,
for instance, by the home-based parent company, makes it
difficult to exercise countervailing influence or power.
Moreover, unions know that bargaining as well as
investment decisions are made in the light of the success of
subsidiaries in other countries. To take one example, the
U.S. autoworkers are aware that negotiations with General
Motors ("GM") is related to conditions at Vauxhall in the
United Kingdom, Opel in Germany, Holder in Australia,
Saab in Sweden, as well as GM plants in Latin and South
America.47
In short, many industrial disputes have an
international dimension. Not only do employers, especially
in the United States, often threaten to move abroad, but
firms themselves are often foreign companies. According to
Jay Mazur, one-third of the members of the United Food
and Commercial Workers Union in the United States are
employed by non-U.S. companies. Approximately two-thirds
of AFL-CIO unions are engaged in some kind of
international activity. 8 Finally, the definition of a national
company is far from clear, e.g., is it where the entity is
incorporated, meaning many "U.S." firms can opt out of
U.S. regulations by reincorporating in a place like
Bermuda, where the headquarters is located, where most of
the stockholders reside? In many cases, the corporation has
the ability to define its own nationality or seek to have
none.
46. James Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REV.
841, 842 (1985) [hereinafter Atleson, Reflections]. Approximately sixty-five
million people are employed by TNEs, twenty-two million in host, not home,
countries. This figure represents about 3% of the world's total workforce. Not
counted, obviously, are the large number of workers, employed by contractors,
for instance, whose working conditions are in effect set by the TNEs. According
to the World Bank, TNEs control 70% of world trade. "In 1990, the world's
largest 350 TNEs accounted for almost 40% of the world's merchandise
trade .... The top 500 TNEs control two-thirds of world trade." TIM LANG &
COLIN HINES, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM 34 (1993). Finally, over 40% of
international trade involves intra-firm transfers. Id.
47. BENDINER, supra note 36, at 49.
48. Jay Mazur, Labor's New Internationalism, FOREIGN AFF. 79 (Jan.-Feb.
2000).
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The growing imbalance of union-management power
has been accentuated by new production strategies,
automation, and communication advances. 49 Not only does
capital flow easily across national borders, but borders are
49. Various definitions of "globalization" have been offered, often relating to
the discipline of the offeror. The OECD, for instance, has provided an economic
definition: "an evolving pattern of cross-border activities of firms involving
international investment, trade and collaboration for purposes of product
development, production and sourcing, and marketing." ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GLOBALISATION OF INDUSTRY 9
(1996). Definitions favoring political and economic dimensions stress changes in
the structure and operation of capitalism involving growing market integration,
globalized firms, and, often, the weakening or "hollowing out" of the nation
state. Sociologists deemphasize a purely economic focus, stressing "the
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such
a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away
and vice versa." ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 64
(1990) (quoting Peter Leisink, Introduction to GLOBALIZATION AND LABOUR
RELATIONS 4-5 (Peter Leisink ed., 1999)).
Conventional accounts have been challenged, especially on the left, without
challenging the notion that capitalism has become a more universal system and
that market and economic transactions are increasingly global. But others have
expressed doubts about how much production has really been
internationalized, about how mobile industrial capital really is, about
the very existence of 'multinational' corporations. Such critics have
pointed out that the vast majority of production still goes on in
nationally-based companies in single locales ... [and] foreign direct
investment has been overwhelmingly concentrated in advanced
capitalist countries, with capital moving from one such country to
another.
Ellen Meiksins Wood, Labor, Class, and State in Global Capitalism, RISING
FROM THE ASHES? LABOR IN THE AGE OF "GLOBAL" CAPITALISM 4 (Ellen Meiksins
Wood et al., eds. 1998). On the other hand, although there were certainly other
times when there was rapid integration among nations driven by the
liberalization of trade, investment and capital flows, technological change, the
current period involves enterprises and workers "of nearly all the world's
countries, in the goods as well as in the services sector." RAYMOND TORRES,
TOWARDS A SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE WORLD ECONOMY 1 (2001).
The ILO World Labour Report 1997-98 indicates the effect of globalization
on unions in both the developed and developing world. For sixty-five countries
between 1985 and 1995, 51% of the countries experienced a decline of union
membership of more than 20% and 25% (sixteen) saw a decline of 5-20%. Only
11% (seven) had a stable union density, 3% (seven) had growth of 5-20%, and
11% (seven) experienced a growth of more than 20% in union membership. See
WORLD LABOUR REPORT 1997-98, supra note 7, at 237-38 (including Table 1.2 of
the Statistical Annex). In addition to the proffered benefits of freer trade, it is
also "associated with greater labour market turnover, with particularly
detrimental consequences for workers with only modestly transferable skills."
In addition, "wider income inequalities can be observed." See TORRES, supra, at
1, 19, 22-32.
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increasingly irrelevant to the marketing and production of
goods."0 Specialized production methods also lessen the
effectiveness of union pressure. For instance, in 1987
Olivetti, the Italy-based multinational, produced electric
typewriters in its domestic factories, calculators in Mexico
and Italy, and computers in Argentina. Labor conflict in
any one country would not affect continued production of
products in other locations.
Multinational firms have the ability when dealing with
subsidiaries to set internally used parts and services so as
to affect apparent costs and tax burdens. Thus, subsidiaries
in different nations may be
charged artificially high rates for shipment of parts or services
from the parent organization or from one subsidiary to another.
The purpose, of course, is to show a low profit for an affiliate or
branch operating in a high-tax country. The procedure is reversed
in low-tax areas where the company would like to have high
profits shown. This is known as 'transfer pricing' and affects
collective bargaining in different regions. Profitability or lack of it
on the company's books, and the ability to pay or meet the cost of
the union demands at the bargaining table, are naturally
important factors in labor negotiations in each subsidiary.5
1
International production systems and cross-border
mergers have the no doubt unintended effect of uniting
workers in different countries working for the same
transnational firm. Internationalized production can also
create compassion among national groups of workers,
especially given different wage rates and terms of
employment. Since as early as 1969 unions have
coordinated action against multinational corporations in
the countries in which the firms operated.52 Trade unions in
Europe in some of the industries affected by the expansion
50. As Breen Creighton notes, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. has opened a
huge new market for goods and services and, in addition, provided a substantial
reserve of relatively cheap labor. Breen Creighton, The Internationalisation of
Labour Law, in REDEFINING LABOUR LAW: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF
TEACHING AND RESEARCH 90, 93 (Richard Mitchell ed., 1995).
51. BENDINER, supra note 36, at 31-32.
52. Cox, supra note 35, at 555-56; see also BURTON BENDINER,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR AFFAIRS 62-88 (1987); TRANSNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS (Hans Gunter ed., 1972); LORD WEDDERBURN, LABOUR LAW AND
FREEDOM: FURTHER ESSAYS IN LABOUR LAW 239-41 (1995) [hereinafter
WEDDERBURN, LABOUR LAW AND FREEDOM].
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of multinational firms, especially chemicals and metal
trades, began to "advocate coordinated action by unions in
different countries in which these corporations had
operations."53 The idea of bargaining with multinational
corporations gave new life to the international trade
secretariats ("ITSs"), international confederations of unions
in the same industry, which had played a less significant
role when unions had been primarily concerned with Cold
War issues.54 The secretariats provide data for bargaining
purposes and also coordinate communication and assistance
among affiliates. Such assistance might involve unions in
the same industry or working for the same TNE, but in
different nations or unions. Certain secretariats, especially
the International Metalworkers' Federation, have tried to
coordinate bargaining across borders.55  Moreover, the
passage of the labor side agreement to NAFTA has spurred
collaborative efforts by United States and Mexican unions,
even among those that could be considered rivals for the
same work.
53. Cox, supra note 35, at 553; see also Andreas Breitenfellner, Global
Unionism: A Potential Player, 136 INT'L LAB. REV. 531 (1997); Harvie Ramsey,
Solidarity at Last? International Trade Unionism Approaching the Millennium,
18 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 503 (1997).
54. See BENDINER, supra note 36, at 34-72; J.P. Windmuller & S.K. Pursey,
The International Trade Union Movement, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 70-76 (Roger
Blanpain & Chris Engels eds., 1993); Andrew Herod, The Practice of
International Labor Solidarity and the Geography of the Global Economy, 71
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 341 (1995) (discussing the efforts of the United Steelworkers
of America to combat the Ravenswood lockout between 1990 and 1992); Robert
Taylor, Trade Unions and Transnational Industrial Relations, Labour and
Society Programme, ILO International Institute for Labour Studies,
DP/99/1999, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp9999
.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); see also John Windmuller, The International
Trade Secretariats, in TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION AMONG LABOR UNIONS 102,
102-19 (Michael Gordon & Lowell Turner eds., 2000); Dan Gallin, Labour as a
Global Social Force, in GLOBAL UNIONS? THEORY AND STRATEGIES OF ORGANIZED
LABOUR IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 235, 235-43 (Jeffrey Harrod &
Robert O'Brien eds., 2002).
55. Herod, supra note 54, at 357; KIM MOODY, AN INJURY TO ALL: THE
DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIONISM (1988). National unions have also begun to
broaden their horizons. The U.S. AFL-CIO, for instance, has recently created a
Solidarity Center to provide technical assistance to organize and support unions
worldwide.
56. KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD 239-42 (1997); DALE HATHAWAY,
ALLIES ACROSS THE BORDER (2000).
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Many of the secretariats began as craft organizations,
but mergers and changes in industrial structure have
caused almost all to become industrial or multi-industrial
in form. The newest sectoral international is Union
Network International ("UNI"), created from four older and
separate organizations, to represent skilled workers'
interests in areas such as entertainment, finance, media,
and communications. UNI claims it has a network of 920
affiliated unions, representing 15.5 million members in 140
countries." Another approach, advocated by The
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel,
Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers'
Associations ("IUF"), is the creation of international
framework agreements with multinationals. Indeed, IUF
has signed several agreements with multinational firms
within its broad jurisdiction."
According to a report in International Union Rights,59 at
least twenty-one International framework agreements have
been signed between global union federations and
transnational firms. These agreements commit the
company to respect minimum labor standards in worldwide
operations. Unlike corporate codes, the IFAs permit unions
to aid in defining and monitoring labor standards.
The most comprehensive organization is the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
("IFCTU") based in Brussels. The current ICFTU was
created in 1949 by national unions which withdrew from
the World Federation of Trade Unions because of the
influence of unions in the eastern block. The ICFTU,
therefore, is a creation of the Cold War. The organization's
membership consists, not of national unions, but, rather, of
national union centers or confederations. Currently, there
are 215 national union centers in 145 nations and
territories, with ap roximately 125 million individual
workers represented.
57. Philip Jennings, Unions Respond to Changes in the Global Economy, 7
INT'L UNION RTS. 24 (2000).
58. See International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, New Framework
Agreements to Help Workers (Jan. 28, 2002), available at http://www.icftu.org/
displaydocument.asp?index=991214637 [hereinafter ICFTU, New Framework].
59. What is an IFA?, 10 INT'L UNION RTs. 25 (2003).
60. ICFTU, New Framework, supra note 58; see also BENDINER, supra note
36, at 35-42; J.P. Windmuller & S.K.Pursey, The International Trade Union
Movement, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
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International solidarity has been advocated both on
altruistic grounds as well as by the more self interested
desire to protect domestic labor standards, especially in
developed nations, against lower foreign standards. More
recently, unions have been concerned with internal
corporate decisions involved with the transfer or location of
production to low wage nations. In addition, the increasing
merger and expansion of multinational firms makes it
rational to build linkages with unions in other nations or to
aid in the creation of unions where none may have
previously existed. The hoped-for aim might be to aid
struggles in other nations, workers in the same
corporations or even to engage in transnational bargaining.
Many difficulties exist, of course, but the rationality of such
action may tend to offset the myriad problems, legal,
institutional, and nationalistic that might exist.
One issue, little researched, is the extent to which
domestic law hinders cooperative efforts across national
boundaries.61  Beyond the considerable problems in
requesting workers in other countries to undergo the
economic hardships of sympathetic job actions, domestic
legal systems have created obstacles to solidarity efforts. A
good example of the problems posed by domestic labor law
is the action of longshore workers in 1997 and 1998 in many
locations in the world which illustrated just how vulnerable
the new global economy might be to transnational labor
pressure.
INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES, 55, 57-62 (Roger Blanpain & Chris Engels
eds, 1993.); Michael Gordon, The International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions: Bread, Freedom, and Peace, in TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION AMONG
LABOR UNIONS 81, 81-101 (Michael E. Gordon & Lowell Turner eds., 2000).
For a critical examination of the ICFTU and the trade union secretariats,
see MOODY, supra note 56, at 227-48.
61. The obstacles caused by restrictions on secondary pressure can be seen
in a domestic example which parallels the international contracting situation.
Jobs for Janitors has attempted to organize workers employed by cleaning
contractors by aiming pressure at building owners and managers in order to
induce them to agree to use unionized contractors. Direct pressure on
contractors is ineffectual because they are so easily replaced by lower-cost non-
union contractors, even if they agree to union representation and terms. See
Catherine Fisk et al., Union Representation of Immigrant Janitors in Southern
California: Economic and Legal Challenges, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE
CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 199 (Ruth Milkman ed.,
2000).
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III. THE DOCKERS DISPUTE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE
TROUBLED VOYAGE OF THE NEPTUNE JADE
"With the growth of multinational enterprise, management
becomes to a large extent an international power-where is the
countervailing power? ... [W]e have management but neither
government nor effective union power. The entire basis of our
thinking on collective industrial relations and collective labor law
is destroyed by this development."
62
A United Kingdom dispute fueled by privatization and
workforce reductions ultimately led to a concerted and
effective secondary boycott effort across the globe. A strike
by longshore workers in 1995 was followed by a refusal of
Mersey Docks employees to cross their picket line. Reports
are conflicting, some indicating that 500 dockers refused to
cross a picket line set up by five workers dismissed after
reportedly refusing to work additional unpaid overtime.63
Ultimately, Mersey terminated 329 employees for refusing
to work, an action the Mersey dockers call a "lock out." The
refusal to cross a picket line was followed by a lockout
under the still applicable restrictive labor laws of the
Thatcher government, the 1980 and 1990 Employment
Acts, which barred secondary activity as well as limiting
the scope of a labor dispute.
The dockers then formed a shop stewards' organization
which began a campaign for reinstatement that spread
from the United Kingdom to ports around the world. The
dockers held an international conference among rank and
file workers in the summer of 1996 where they called for an
international effort on their behalf. Unlike other workers
facing similar problems in recent times, the Liverpool
workers became an international cause as the symbol of the
"demise of England's unionized longshore industry. They
were the last union workers in the industry, which had
62. Otto Kahn-Freund, A Lawyer's Reflections on Multinational
Corporations, 14 J. INDus. REL. (Aus.) 351, 356 (1972).
63. The dispute also involved the 329 Liverpool dockers who were sacked by
the Mersey Dock and Harbour Company. Jim Lamb, Oakland Lawsuit Sparks
Day-Long Protest, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Feb. 25, 1998, at 1.
Liverpool seems to be the only dock in the United Kingdom still operating
under a collective bargaining agreement. Alexander Cockburn, The Fate of the
Neptune Jade, NATION, Mar. 23, 1998, at 9.
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been privatized by Britain's then Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher."64
According to labor author Kim Moody,
representatives from twelve ports in eight countries attended and
agreed to put pressure on their own unions and International
Transport Workers' Federation (ITF)... to call a day of action.
The first such day, September 28, was only a partial success. But
by 1997 the ITF had called on its members to join in a week of
actions, beginning on January 20, in whatever way they could. An
impressive list of unions around the world signed on.
Dockworkers in Seattle, Tacoma, and other United States
West Coast ports were asked by the International
Longshore and Warehouse Union ("ILWU") to stay off the
job for one shift on Monday, January 20, 1997, in solidarity
with the British dockworkers."
Symbolic as well as direct labor actions occurred in over
100 ports, and workers in many locations refused to unload
cargo from ships originating in LiverpoolY. In the United
States the ILWU closed down the West Coast for eight
hours on January 20, while Oregon ports remained closed
for twenty-four hours.6" As Moody perceptively notes, the
"Merseyside dockers had given world labor a lesson in how
to counter the power not only of dock, shipping, and the
other transportation firms, but of all the TNEs whose vast
investments rest on this fragile transportation system." 9
The issue is even more dramatically highlighted by the
voyage of the Neptune Jade, a 2,966 TEU freighter of
64. Rick Del Vecchio, Dockworkers To Protest Industry Suit: Damages
Sought Over Picketing in Oakland, S.F. CHRON. Feb. 20, 1998, at A20; see also
Paul Heylman, Extraterritorial Impact of United States Labor Unions and
United States Labor Laws of the Maritime Industry, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 59,
68-71 (1998).
65. MOODY, supra note 56, at 250.
66. Union is Asking Dockworkers to Shut Ports On Monday, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 16, 1997, at B6.
67. MOODY, supra note 56, at 250.
68. Bill Mongelluzzo et al., Just as Expected, Dockers Walk Out Across the
Globe, J. COM., Jan. 22, 1997, at Al. I have not found any evidence that the
East Coast union of longshoremen, the ILA, took any action. As will be noted,
the ILA has also engaged in international action, although it historically has
been moved by quite different political causes than the ILWU.
69. MOODY, supra note 56, at 251.
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Singapore's Orient Lines." The Jade's cargo had been
loaded in Thamesport, England, in 1997, during the dispute
referred to above which had originally arisen in September,
1995. The Jade was believed to have been loaded by the
unionists' former employer, although employer associations
asserted that the owner of the Thamesport Dock facility
was not related to Merseyside.7'
When the Neptune Jade arrived in Oakland, California,
on September 28, 1997, it was met by a picket line
composed of various groups, among them the Labor Party's
Golden Gate chapter, students from a labor society at
Laney College in Oakland, members of various unions, and
members of the Industrial Workers of the World who rallied
together via e-mail.72 Over a three-day period, longshore
workers refused to cross the picket line and unload the
ship.
Shipping industry officials claimed at the time that the
work stoppage was costing the Neptune Orient Lines as
much as $40,000 to $50,000 a day, but the ILWU contended
that crossing the picket line would endanger their safety, a
position accepted initially by the parties' arbitrator, Gerald
Sutliff.73  The shipping and stevedoring companies
responsible for the Jade in Oakland apparently sought to
enjoin the picketing or at least limit the number of
demonstrators and, in addition, to order their unionized
workers to cross the picket line. Each effort failed to
70. The TEU designation reflects the new reality on the docks. No longer are
ships routinely referred to by the tonnage they carry. Instead, ships like the
Neptune Jade carry containers, representing about 80% of the cargo carried
around the world. A TEU is a twenty-foot unit (20" x 8" x 8"), and thus, a TEU
means a twenty-foot equivalent unit. Many ships now carry forty-foot units.
PETER WATERMAN, GLOBALIZATION, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONALISMS 84 (1998).
71. Del Vecchio, supra note 64, at A20; Neptune Orient Lines, NOL HD:US
Court Orders Dockers to Work on NOL, ASIA INTELLIGENCE WIRE, Oct. 3, 1997
(stating that seven of the 160 containers on the Jade were loaded at
Thamesport).
72. See Ilana DeBare, Longshoremen Boycott Freightline, S. F. CHRON., Sept.
30, 1997, at C2; Solidarity Is Our Right!: Labor Party Members Help Send SCAB
Ship, Neptune Jade Packing, OCAW Takes on Crown Petroleum, LAB. PARTY
PRESS, May, 1998, at 4, available at http://lpa.igc.org/lpv33/jade.htm; The Saga
of the "Neptune Jade": Rank & File Coalition Turns Away Scab Cargo With
Direct Action, INDUS. WORKER, Dec. 1997, at 7 [hereinafter Rank & File, INDUS.
WORKER].
73. Journal of Commerce, p. 13A, Oct. 1, 1997; see also Terry Brennan,
ILWU Told it Must Unload NOL Ship, J. CoM., Oct. 2, 1997, at 13B.
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accomplish the desired end. The parties' arbitrator,
however, who initially refused to order the normally not
meek longshoremen to cross the picket line since it was a
hazard to their health, reversed his ruling on the following
day, perhaps due to the presence of police on the second day
of picketing. In addition, a California court limited the
number of pickets to four, although picketers exceeded that
number on the following day."4
After three days the ship left the port of Oakland
without having been unloaded. 5 The Jade then sailed to
Vancouver, British Columbia, where a similar scenario
unfolded, and, again, the ship was not unloaded. 6 After five
hours of picketing by approximately thirty pickets, the Jade
left for Yokohama, Japan, where the All-Japan
Dockworkers' Union refused to unload the ship.77
Reportedly, the Jade was finally unloaded in Taiwan. 8
Depending upon your point of view, the travails of the
Neptune Jade may be a stimulating example of
74. Tom Price, The Neptune Jade Vacations in Oakland, DISPATCHER (S.F.),
Oct. 1997, at 1; DeBare, supra note 72, at C2; see also Eric Brazil, Oakland
Dock Workers Refuse to Unload Ship, Union Members Say They Won't Cross
British Picket Line, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 30, 1997, at A9; David Osler, 'Neptune
Jade' Bids to Beat Boycott, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Oct. 2, 1997, at 10. On the
issuance of picketing injunctions by state courts, see James B. Atleson, The
Legal Community and the Transformation of Disputes: The Settlement of
Injunction Actions, 23 LAW & Soc'y REv. 41 (1989); James B, Atleson, The Circle
of Boys Market: A Comment on Judicial Inventiveness, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 88
(1985) [hereinafter Atleson, The Circle of Boys Market].
75. The business press stressed that Thamesport had announced that it was
not a subsidiary of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company and that therefore
the "blacking" of the Jade was a mistake. David Osler, Thamesport Quashes
Union Claim, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Oct. 4, 1997, at 10.
76. Labor Protesters Block Ship, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 6, 1997, at A3; Felix
Chan, NOL Ship Picketed Again in Vancouver, Bus. TIMES (Sing.), Oct. 7, 1997,
at 1.
77. Jerzy Farynski, AUSTRALASIAN BUS. INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 14, 1997, at 2;
David Hughes, K Line, Mitsui, and NYK Stand to Gain From Japanese Port
Reforms, Bus. TIMES (Sing.), Nov. 3, 1997, at 1; Rank & File, INDUS. WORKER,
supra note 72, at 7.
78. Rick Del Vecchio, Supports of Labor Rally Against Ship Industry Suit,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 1998, at A21. Howard Kimmeldorf has noted that this
story reflects the impact of the Cold War in a number of ways. For instance, it is
doubtful that the ILA with its more conservative history would have
participated in the boycott. Moreover, Taiwan itself is a product of the Cold
War. See generally Ellen Schrecker, McCarthyism's Ghosts: Anticommunism
and American Labor, NEW LAB. F., Spring-Summer 1999, at 7.
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transnational labor solidarity. 9 Given the international
relationship of production and marketing, transportation
workers take on a new importance." In addition, even non-
transportation workers have been involved in cross border
activity such as providing economic or staff support, for
instance, to new independent unions in Mexico, or lending
support to strikes or disputes in other countries. The
Renault and UPS examples, to be subsequently discussed,
are only two of many cases of cooperative efforts.
Moreover, the International Trade Secretariats have
recently been active, for instance, in bringing together
unions representing workers in subsidiaries of
transnational enterprises ("TNEs"), and lobbying and public
opinion campaigns have been waged by ITUs, unions, and
international confederations of unions."' Canadian unions
have set up "international labor solidarity funds," paid via
payroll deductions negotiated with employers aimed at
helping unions and other organizations in other nations,
especially in the south. The future role of such action,
however, turns on the legality of such pressure under the
domestic law of the state in which a union engages in
79. In early 1998, the Liverpool dockers decided to end their dispute.
According to Jimmy Nolan, chairman of the Shop Stewards Committee of the
Merseyside Dockers, the Labour government refused to intervene or use the
power of the 14% holding it possesses in the Mersey Dock and Harbour
Company. Since the dockers had been made "redundant," each docker was
entitled to compensation of 28,000 pounds. Interview by Suzanne Jones at the
European Workers' Conference for the Abrogation of the Maastricht Treaty,
Berlin, (Jan. 31, 1998); E-mail from Michael Eisencher to James Atleson,
Professor of Law, University at Buffalo (May 8, 1998) (on file with author).
Faced with a lack of support from those with power to assist them, the dockers
took the best means available to support themselves and their families.
80. Mechanization and container shipping have reduced the size of U.S.
longshore unions. The International Longshoremen's Union, representing
workers on the East Coast, signed a contract to permit labor-saving production
methods in 1969 when it had 27,000 members. Today, "after attrition and
retirements, there remain only 2,700 active longshoremen." Ronald Smothers,
New Day on the Docks: They're Hiring Brains, Not Brawn, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2000, at B8. But for the first time in years, hiring is occurring as there are too
few longshore workers to handle the growing volume of cargo in the harbors of
New Jersey and New York. See id.
81. See Trade Unions in the Throes of Change, WORLD LABOUR REPORT:
1997-1998, supra note 7, at 39-44; Deborah Greitzer, Cross-Border Responses to
Labor Repression in North America, 1995 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U.L. REV. 917;
Dan La Botz, Making Links Across the Border, LAB., Aug. 1994, at 7; see also,
Lance Compa, The International Labor Standards and Instruments of Recourse
for Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 151, 170-71 (1992).
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sympathetic action. In the United States and the United
Kingdom, such pressure directly confronts prohibitions on
secondary or sympathetic action. In Japan, Canada, and
other countries there are no explicit statutory bars to
secondary or sympathetic labor action, but there are often
statutes that limit the scope of labor activity only to
employers directly involved in a dispute. 2 Moreover, many
nations explicitly bar political strikes or, like the United
States, consider them within the secondary boycott laws.
When national laws restrict sympathetic or secondary
actions by workers, whether wholly within one nation or
cutting across national borders, they "deconstruct" class,
emptying it of social reality and social significance.83 Indeed,
one obvious purpose of secondary boycott restrictions may
be precisely to limit the ability of workers to express
solidarity as workers. Often, unions attempt to characterize
a strike as something else, e.g., an expression of free speech
or the advocacy of civil rights. Nevertheless, the labor laws
of many nations treat the very real feeling of solidarity,
revealed in the cases discussion below, as unworthy of
recognition or protection.
IV. THE INTERNATIONALISM OF DOCKWORKERS
The use of political strikes is hardly new on the docks.
Longshore workers have historically been known for their
militancy and collectivism. In addition, a sense of
internationalism goes with the job. Calvin Winslow and
Bruce Nelson have documented a number of early actions,
involving sympathetic actions as well as clearly political
strikes. In 1920, for instance, New York longshoremen
organized a strike in support of opponents of British rule in
Ireland, protesting the imprisonment of the nationalist
82. In New Zealand, for instance, the new ECA holds lawful only strikes
related to the negotiation of a collective employment contract for the employees
concerned. Strikes are also illegal during the term of a collective employment
agreement. See Ellen J. Dannin, Bargaining Under New Zealand's Employment
Contracts Act: The Problem of Coercion, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 455, 475-76 & n.110
(1996); see also Ellen J. Dannin, Consummating Market-Based Labor Law
Reform in New Zealand: Context and Reconfiguration, 14 B. U. INT'L L.J. 267
(1996).
83. Suggested to author by Howard Kimmeldorf.
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mayor of Cork.84 Even earlier, during the London dock
strike of 1889, Australians sent 30,000 pounds sterling to
the strike committee. This was followed one year later when
British maritime workers responded to an Australian
maritime strike with considerable financial support.85
Bruce Nelson reports at least two strikes in the 1930s
on the U.S. West Coast to protest Mussolini's war against
Ethiopia and U.S. opposition to German ships bearing the
swastika.86 Moreover, political action by dockworkers has
occurred in many other locales. For instance, the ILWU
participated in protests against General Pinochet's
dictatorship in Chile, and also refused to handle South
African cargoes during the apartheid period.87 Furthermore,
dockworker actions have been seen by some as effective
tools in the fight for basic human rights. When Nelson
Mandela visited the United States in 1991, he specifically
thanked the ILWU for solidarity actions in the 1970s and
1980s, such as the refusal to handle South African cargoes,
which he said had been crucial in "re-igniting" anti-
apartheid action in the United States." On April 24, 1999,
the ILWU shut down all West Coast ports as part of a
national action to prevent the execution of a death row
prisoner, Mumia Abu-Jamal. Perhaps unacquainted with
the history just described, ILWU President Brian
McWilliams stated that "[i]n our long history of social
activism, the ILWU has never before closed the entire Coast
for a social cause." 9
The immediacy of these issues is reflected by another
recent dispute. On April 7, 1998, the Patrick Stevedores
Company ("Patrick") in Australia, with the strong support
of the national government, fired over 2000 full and part-
84. Calvin Winslow, Introduction to WATERFRONT WORKERS: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND CLASS 3, 68 (Calvin Winslow ed., 1998).
85. See PETER WATERMAN, GLOBALIZATION, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THE
NEW INTERNATIONALISMS 79-82 (1998); for other examples, see id. at 88-100.
86. Bruce Nelson, "Penecost" on the Pacific: Maritime Workers and Workingg
Class Consciousness in the 1930s, in POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY 141,
152-55 (Maurice Zeitlin ed., 1984); BRUCE NELSON, WORKERS ON THE
WATERFRONT: SEAMEN, LONGSHOREMEN, AND UNIONISM IN THE 1930s (1988).
87. See Cockburn, supra note 63, at 9.
88. Alexander Cockbur, Will a Tsunami of Suits Sink Dockworkers?, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1998, at B9.
89. Steve Stallone & Al Weinrub, Longshore Union Closes West Coast Ports
to Back New Trial for Death Row Prisoner, LAB. NOTES (Detroit), June, 1999, at
10.
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time dockworkers or "warfies." ° In fact, the company had
transferred its unionized workforce about a year previously
to four wholly owned labor hire firms with no assets. It then
leased back its labor force from these companies. It "fired"
the workers by ending its lease contracts with these firms.
Patrick then claimed it was not the employer of the
workers.
The International Transport Workers' Federation
("ITF") warned shipping lines about using Patrick's
facilities in Australia, noting that its United States
affiliate, the ILWU, had mobilized its West Coast locals.
The largest union in the Netherlands also promised to take
action." In addition, unions in South Africa, the United
States, and Japan announced plans to boycott any
Australian shipping loaded by nonunion labor. Lloyd's List,
the daily paper of the shipping industry, noted that the
"power of the federation has been a major worry for ship
owners who use Patrick," and it cited the success of the
boycott against the Neptune Jade.92 Indeed, ILWU members
refused to work on the Columbus Matson when it arrived in
Los Angeles on May 9, 1998, because it was loaded by non-
union labor in Australia. This refusal led to an arbitrator's
ruling that the strike breached the collective agreement,
and he ordered the longshoremen back to work. To avoid
contractual liability, the Union had argued that the strike
was not sanctioned but was the result of personal decisions
made by rank and file members. Despite the ruling, the
parties apparently reached a settlement under which the
employer would drop charges against the union and the
union would only have to unload that part of the cargo, said
to be the majority, which was loaded by union workers in
Australia. "A statement has been made. The scab cargo will
remain on the ship," said the ILWU's president Brian
McWilliams.93
Thus far, the Australian Federal Court has upheld a
ruling that Patrick had entered into an illegal conspiracy to
break the union, and an injunction against Patrick required
90. See Row Over Austrailian Docks Sackings Flares into Violence, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 10, 1998.
91. UK: ITF Warns Trade Unionists Against Use of Patrick Facilities, AAP
INFO. SERVS. PTY. LTD., Apr. 9, 1998.
92. Waterfront Coup, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Apr. 9, 1998, at 5.
93. Bill Mongelluzzo, Port Employers: ILWU Has Lost Control of Locals, J.
COM., May 28, 1998, at 12A.
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it to rehire the sacked workers until the conclusion of an
action brought by the union to contest the sacking of union
workers. Government representatives strongly supported
the company, arguing that reform and efficiency had to be
brought to the docks to allow Australia "to compete against
the best in the world."94 Indeed, there seems to be a
repeated pattern of governments, mostly conservative ones
as in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand,
delimiting the scope of trade union rights and being
particularly interested in longshore workers.95
The International Metalworkers Federation, meeting in
Sydney, resolved to "promote a campaign within the
international trade union movement for recognition of
sympathy strikes across borders." This resolution, endorsed
by the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union, came
after the federal government promised to make secondary
boycott laws more stringent.
There is a growing recognition among unions that in an
interrelated economic world certain groups of workers can
exert significant pressure. For instance, Australian dockers
have promised militant action, including sympathetic
strikes, against Melbourne-based BHP Billiton because of
the sacking of forty workers at a smelter in Mozambique.
Doug Cameron, union president, said that the union would
take action in support of workers being treated inhumanely
94. David Palmer, Australian Government Declares War on Unions, LAB.
NOTES (Detroit), May, 1998, at 2 (quoting Peter Reith); David Bacon, War on the
Waterfront, NATION, May 18, 1998, at 6. For a detailed explanation of this
dispute and the government's involvement, see Rob Lambert, Australia's
Historic Industrial Relations Transition, in GLOBALIZATION AND LABOUR
RELATIONS 212, 232-42 (Peter Leisink ed., 1999). For accounts of the various
revisions of Australia's statutes dealing with secondary and primary boycotts,
see Robert McClelland, Sections 45D and 45E of the Trade Practices Act 1974:
Re-born or Misconceived? 16 AuS. B. REV. 118 (1996); see also D. Bruce Moore,
Industrial Action and Secondary Boycotts: The Industrial Relations Reform Act
1993, 22 AUS. Bus. L. REV. 370 (1994).
95. Some of these limitations have been altered by electoral victories of left
or liberal parties. In Australia, for example, the Howard government in 1997
rejected the restrictive provisions of the prior government and reinstated prior
provisions of the Trade Practices Act. Although the statutory structure is still
complex, it seems that secondary actions are not per se illegal; instead, they are
permitted if the purpose of the action relates to employment matters. See PAUL
LATIMER, AUSTRALIAN BUSINESSS LAW, 610-11 (19th ed. 2000); McClelland,
supra note 94; Gregory McCarry, Sanctions and Industrial Action, 7 Aus. J.
LAB. L. 198 (1994); Marilyn Pittard, Industrial Conflict and Constraints:
Sanctions on Industrial Action in Victoria, 6 Aus. J. LAB. L. 159 (1993).
118 [Vol. 52
NEPTUNE JADE
by BHP. "If that means we break unfair Australian laws,
then so be it. We will not give up our rights to take action
as trade unions because of these industrial laws."96
The longshoremen's sense of internationalism is
reflected even in primary disputes. In December, 1999, a
shipping company, Nordana Lines of Norway, docking at
South Carolina's State Ports Authority's Columbus Street
Terminal in Charleston, announced that it had contracted
with a nonunion stevedoring company after having used
unionized longshoremen for over twenty years. Dockers,
represented by the International Longshoremens'
Association, engaged in three actions in response, each
more emotional than the last. The first involved briefly
blocking the authority's terminal entrance. With every call
by a Nordana ship, however, tension increased. In early
January, 2000, seventy-five longshoremen reportedly
stormed through the terminal, disrupted Nordana's
operations, spray painted several ships waiting to be
loaded, sliced hoses on several container handlers, and
damaged a mechanism on one of the port's cranes. These
actions forced the ship to sail without some of its cargo.
The most serious clash occurred on January 20, and,
unsurprisingly, there are radically different accounts on
what occurred. Reports sympathetic to the union stress that
workers entering the union hall at approximately 11:30
p.m., reporting that they had been harassed by police at
union roadblocks. Local union president Ken Riley stated
that about 130 workers filed out of the hall to meet a police
line.97 Riley stated that the police "drew an invisible line
that we were dared not to cross. The workers crossed the
line, and the military units tried to push us back-poking
96. Unions Blasts Australian's BHP Billiton for Mozambique Layoffs,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Nov. 15, 2001; see also Natalie Davison, BHP
Billiton Plan Pits Unions Against Government, AAP INFO. SERVS., Nov. 14,
2001.
97. JoAnn Wypijewski, Audacity on Trial: Talking Union Still Amounts to a
Punishable Offense in Parts of the Old South, NATION, Aug. 6, 2001, at 20. The
clash, however, took on a life of its own. Demonstrations were held in
Charleston. Meanwhile, later accounts varied from the earlier ones. Thus,
according to the Campaign for Workers' Rights in South Carolina, Riley and
other officers created a buffer between the 600 officers and the picketers.
Justice for the Charleston 5, available at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutaflcio/
ecouncil/ec0801d2001.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). A police officer, it is
claimed, ran out of formation and clubbed Riley in the head and a fight ensued.
Id.; see also Report from Charleston, NEW LAB. F., Spring-Summer 2001, at 64.
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us with clubs. Of course, a conflict ensued. When that
happened, the police started beating on the guys."98 Violence
clearly occurred, but whether it was initiated by the
workers or police is not clear. According to press reports,
generally dramatic and clearly not sympathetic to the
workers, a large number of longshoremen, varying between
300 to 600 depending on the report, marched at midnight
from the local union hall to the nearby terminal and
clashed with police officers, estimated at anywhere between
100 to 600 strong. Police dispersed the workers with tear
gas, concussion grenades, and at least one smoke grenade.99
Approximately ten persons, including two police officers,
were sent to the hospital, according to press reports.
Some ILA members refer to the event as a "police riot,"
and a clash provoked by the police presence, although some
comments attributed to union officers seem to admit the
accuracy of the police charge that members of the crowd
threw items at police officers. °° These actions, many said,
were uncharacteristic of peaceful relations in Charleston.
As the owner of the Charleston Line Handling Corporation,
Robert New, noted, "What happened was unacceptable and
very un-Charleston-like."'0 1 Subsequently, five members of
the ILA local were indicted on criminal trespass and rioting
98. Fighting Racism and Union Busting in South Carolina, Interview with
Ken Riley, 5 WORKING USA 119, 124 (2001) [hereinafter Fighting Racism].
99. Dockworkers Erupt Over Nonunion Help, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 2000,
at A20. Cf Tony Bartelme, Business Resumes in Wake of Melee, J. CoM., Jan.
24, 2000, at 3; Tony Bartelme, Nordana, ILS Reach Agreement, J. COM., Apr.
20, 2000, at 16; Stella M. Hopkins, Union Protest Turns Violent at Charleston,
S.C., Port, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 21, 2000, at 61.
100. The information about this dispute comes from numerous articles
found via a Lexis/Nexis search on May 2, 2001, and Ashaki Binta, Solidarity
Frows for Dockers Victimized by "Police Riot," LAB. NOTES (Detroit), Apr. 2001,
at 1, 14. Especially useful were articles in the Boston Globe and the Journal of
Commerce. See, e.g., Dockworkers Erupt Over Nonunion Help, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 21, 2000, at A20; Tony Bartelme, Nordana, ILS Reach Agreement, J. COM.,
Apr. 20, 2000, at 16; see also John McLaughlin, Ports: Longshoremen Win
Partial Victory, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Apr. 26, 2000, at 16; Stella M. Hopkins,
Labor Dispute Leads to Violence, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 21, 200, at 1B
[hereinafter Hopkins, Labor Dispute]; Stella M. Hopkins, Charleston Nervious
About Disruption at Money-Making Port, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 23, 2000,
at 6A; Tony Bartelme, Post Stays Calm; 600 Police on Site, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 2, 2000, at 1B; Port Stays Calm; 600 Police on Site,
POST & COURIER (CHARLESTON, S.C.), Feb. 2, 2000, at 1.
101. Tony Bartleme, ILA Says Charleston Riot Was Aberration, J. COM.,
Feb. 7, 2000, at 1.
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charges, and a court issued an injunction prohibiting mass
picketing and interference with Nordana ships, and also
limiting picketers to nineteen. There is a strong racial
aspect to the dispute, aside from the location. The local is
predominantly African American. Only two of the over 800
local 1422 members are white. °2 The trial, scheduled for
November 14, 2001, has been sidetracked by an agreement
to plead no contest to a magistrate-level offense and pay
fines of $100. The settlement was viewed by the union and
its supporters as a significant victory."3
Nordana is a small player on the Charleston docks,
bringing in only two ships a month, but it was the first time
a major shipping line challenged the union in this fashion.
Apparently, larger shipping lines only use unionized
longshoremen to load containers on the East Coast. The
ILA, according to the Journal of Commerce, has lost
virtually all of its bulk grain work on the Gulf Coast.
Moreover, operators organized by the Teamsters have
moved into general cargo at some ports, and the use of
containers themselves has radically reduced longshore
jobs.' In addition, although ILA members dominate the
Port's Authority's five public terminals, which handle
approximately 80% of the port's freight, there are private
docks and more are planned.0 5
The simmering five-month long dispute was settled in
April, 2001, when Nordana agreed to once again use union
labor, and ILA agreed to apply its "small boat" agreement
permitting smaller gang sizes and more flexible work
rules.16
One of the noteworthy features of the Nordana dispute
is the language used by local officials. For example,
102. There are two other locals-an all white clerical and checkers local and
a third, involving maintenance and repair workers, 70% of which are African
American. See Fighting Racism, supra note 98, at 120.
103. David Bacon, The Charleston Five: South Carolina Declares War on
Unions, IN THESE TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, available at www.inthesetimes.com (last
visited Mar. 24, 2004); see also Robert Irminger, Total Victory! PMA Drops
Neptune Jade Lawsuit, available at http://www.igc.org/igc/ln/hl/98120225212/
hll.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
104. See Charleston Obtains Box Record, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Dec. 12, 2000,
at 19.
105. Hopkins, Labor Dispute, supra note 100, at lB.
106. Tony Bartelme, Nordana, ILA Reach Agreement, J. COM., Apr. 20,
2000, at 16; Tony Bartleme, Shipper, ILA End Standoff, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Apr. 19, 2000, at 9A.
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Kenneth Riley, president of ILA Local 1422 stated, "This
issue is global in nature."' °7 The Spanish dockworkers union
notified the captain of the ship loaded in Charleston that
they would unload it but would refuse to work any further
ships loaded "unprofessionally." 8  In announcing
expressions of support from longshoremen in Spain,
Denmark, England, and Australia, Riley also stated that he
had received $100,000 from union dockworkers in San
Francisco and Los Angeles, which are represented by the
West Coast longshore union, the ILWU. Moreover, Riley
asserted that "dockworkers around the world have pledged
to shut down their ports on the first day of the criminal
trials stemming from the police clash."' "The issue isn't
just about a small shipping line," he said, "[t]he same thing
is happening all over the world.""0  Indeed, the
encroachment of private interests into ports has caused
work stoppages in the last few years in India, Israel, Chile,
Brazil, British Columbia, Canada, and Australia."'
A second relevant aspect of the dispute was the role of
the International Transport Federation, which reportedly
told Nordana that a problem in Charleston meant the
shipping line had "a problem around the world.""2 The ITF
is an international trade secretariat representing 570
affiliated transport unions in 132 countries, with a total
membership of five million workers."3 Reports sympathetic
to the union, for example, indicate that during the dispute
Spanish workers refused to handle Nordana ships."4
107. Tony Bartelme, Nordana, ILA Reach Agreement, J. CoM., Apr. 20,
2000, at 16.
108. Freda Coodin, Charleston 5 Celebrate Victory, LAB. NOTES (Detroit),
Apr. 2002, at 5.
109. Steve Early, Talking Shop, IN THESE TIMES, May 28, 2001, at 8.
110. Tony Bartelme, ILA Given Moral and Cash Support, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Mar. 9, 2000, at B1.
111. South Carolina Judge Limits ILA Pickets, J. CoM., Jan. 31, 2000, at 12.
112. See McLaughlin, supra note 100, at 16.
113. Bruice Barnard, ITF Launches 'Charleston Five' Campaign, J. COM.,
Apr. 6, 2001, at 133.
114. Wypijewski, supra note 97, at 21; Carl Biers, Charleston
Longshoremen Lead Battle for Reform, UNION DEMOCRACY REV., Aug.-Sept.
2001, at 11.
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V. RECENT EXPRESSIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL SOLIDARITY
Transnational solidarity actions have not been limited
to longshore workers. Numerous sympathetic actions have
occurred, although they are not often reported in the
mainstream press. The U.S. Teamsters Union strike
against UPS in 1997, for example, was widely discussed as
the possible harbinger of renewed U.S. union militancy, but
little reported were the efforts of foreign unions to support
the strike. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters
("IBT") and the ITF11 formed the World Council of UPS
Trade Unions and implemented an international strategy
aimed at threatening UPS operations abroad. (UPS has
worldwide operations that include 340,000 employees, 500
aircraft, and 2400 facilities in over 200 countries.) Those
operations were vulnerable because UPS, which dominates
the U.S. market, operates in a much more competitive
market in other areas, especially in Europe.
A meeting was held in London in February, 1997, which
included union officials and UPS shop stewards from ITF
affiliated unions in Europe and the United States, and
unions from Brazil and Ireland who planned to organize
UPS workers in their countries. The representatives shared
information about UPS and discussed issues that seemed to
parallel those confronting the IBT, e.g., subcontracting,
part-time workers, and health and safety issues. The group
was formalized as the World Council of UPS Trade Unions,
an organization that would create an information network
and support structure especially in light of the upcoming
UPS-IBT negotiations. Since the IBT represents two-thirds
of UPS workers globally, the outcome of those negotiations
was critical for non-U.S. unions.116
A World Action Day was created in spring, 1997, and a
World Council meeting was scheduled in Washington in
115. Road transport is one of the eight major sections of the ITF. See
Winslow, supra note 84, at 68. For a critique of the ITF, see WATERMAN, supra
note 70, at 88-89.
116. See generally, John Russo & Andy Banks, How Teamsters Took the
UPS Strike Overseas, WORKING USA, Jan.-Feb., 1999, at 75-87. A more detailed
version of this article may be found in Andy Banks & John Russo, The
Development of International Campaign-Based Network Structures: A Case
Study of the IBT and ITF World Council of UPS Unions, 20 CoMp. LAB. L. &
POLY J. 543 (1999). See also Jay Mazur, Labor's New Internationalism,
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 79.
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June of that year to coincide with the final period of the
UPS-IBT negotiations. On May 22, 1997, over 150 job
actions and demonstrations occurred at UPS facilities
around the world, and some short work stoppages occurred
in Spain and Italy. The second meeting of the World
Council occurred in June, and members of the Council were
introduced at the bargaining session.117 After the U.S.
Teamsters struck, demonstrations and some sympathy
strikes occurred at important distribution centers in
Europe. European unions were requested to make public
commitments to support the strike and to create boycott
plans for UPS, information that would be delivered to the
largest customers of UPS. In addition, European public
sector unions were asked to appeal to their "members who
were customs officers and labor inspectors to give greater
scrutiny to UPS packages and UPS workplace-safety
standards during the strike." '118 The function of these steps,
obviously, was to create doubts about the efficacy of UPS
service during any strike.
In addition, various sympathetic actions occurred in
Europe. Since sympathy strikes result in sanctions in the
United Kingdom, sickouts occurred. A wildcat strike
occurred among UPS distribution center workers in
Belgium, although the UPS strike may have been a pretext
for local health and safety concerns. Stoppages or
interferences with deliveries occurred in India, the
Philippines, and in Spain. The settlement in the United
States occurred before planned sympathy actions could
occur in Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Many of
these unions may well have had grievances of their own or
used the strike in the United States as an organizing tool.
Nevertheless, these actions took place at great risk since
many that occurred or were planned were probably
illegal.119
117. See Russo, supra note 116, at 79.
118. Id. at 82.
119. For other recent examples of transnational union activities, often
involving cooperative activities with non-labor groups as well as unions, see
WORLD LABOuR REPORT 1997-98, supra note 7. For the international activities
of the CWA, see Larry Cohen and Steve Early, Defending Workers'Rights in the
Global Economy: The CWA Experience, in WHICH DIRECTION FOR ORGANIZED
LABOR? 143 (Bruce Nissen ed., 1999).
In November, 1990, the Ravenswood Aluminum plant in West Virginia
locked out its 1700 employees and hired permanent replacements. The USWA
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The recent actions against Renault in Europe
demonstrate how "a transnational realm of European
government presents a series of new opportunities and
constraints for domestic social actors," as Renault's actions
led to criticism by the European Union as well as domestic
forms of worker action.12 ° In February, 1997, the President
of the Renault automobile company, Europe's sixth largest
carmaker, announced the closure of its the heavily
unionized plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium, because it had
began a sophisticated corporate campaign, which included visits to European
locales, to put pressure on Marc Rich, a Switzerland-based billionaire fugitive
from U.S. law who apparently controlled the company. See TOM JURAVICH &
KATE BRONFENBRENNER, RAVENSWOOD: THE STEELWORKERS' VICTORY AND THE
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN LABOR (1999).
During a year-long strike at Continental General Tire factory in Charlotte,
North Carolina, for instance, the Steelworkers pressured the factory's corporate
parent, Continental A.G., a German firm which is the fourth largest tire
manufacturer in the world. Workers at a Continental plant in South Africa
engaged in a sympathy strike. Pressure was directed at Ford to stop using
Continental tires. David Moberg, Striking Back: The Steelworkers Won't Let Up,
IN THESE TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at 10, 12; Steven Greenhouse, Tentative Contract
in Yearlong Strike at North Carolina Tire Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1999, at
A19.
An excellent analysis of a corporate campaign by the United Steelworkers of
America (USWA) against General Tire's Charlotte, North Carolina plant can be
found in Thomas Greven, Transnational "Corporate Campaigns". A Tool for
Labour Unions in the Global Economy?, 19 INT'L J. COM. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL.
495 (2003). The union used a sophisticated and sustained campaign of pressure
on Generl Tire's German parent, Continental AG, in Germany. These efforts
resulted in repeated media attention despite the often lukewarm support of
German unions used to more cooperative methods of dispute resolution.
Another example involves the United Mine Workers Union 1993 strike
against Peabody Holding Co., the largest coal company in the United States.
Peabody is owned by Hanson PLC, an Anglo-American conglomerate and the
sixth largest industrial corporation in the United Kingdom Union workers in
Australia, employed by Peabody, and Hanson battery workers in South Africa
went on a 24-hour solidarity strike. See Kenneth Zinn, Solidarity Across
Borders: The UMWA's Corporate Campaign Against Peabody and Hanson PLC,
in TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION AMONG LABOR UNIONS 223, 223-37 (Michael
Gordon & Lowell Turner eds., 2000).
Communications International, representing 4.5 million telecom and postal
workers around the world recently pledged joint international action aimed at
U.S. multinational Sprint Corporation. The trade union secretariat also
endorsed merging into a broader consortium that will represent over 15 million
members of 800 affiliated unions in more than 140 countries. World's Telecom
Unions Censure Sprint, CWA NEWS, Oct. 1999, at 7.
120. See DOUG IMIG AND SIDNEY TARROW, FROM STRIKE TO EUROSTRIKE: THE
EUROPEANIZATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EURo-
POLITY (Weatherhead Ctr. for Int'l Affairs, Working Paper No. 97-10, 1996).
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suffered serious financial losses. The result was a protest
from a number of European nations, concern from the EU,
and the first "Euro-strike."
Belgian, French, and European Union officials
expressed outrage, in part because the action violated EU
regulations concerning obligations to provide notice of plant
closures and to negotiate. In addition, at the same time as
the closing, Renault had planned to use EU structural
funds to expand an existing plant in Spain. This led an
embarrassed Spain to withdraw its plan to aid the
expansion so as not to appear to replace a viable Belgium
operation with a facility in a cheaper location. Worker
demonstrations and strikes occurred across Europe. On
March 7th, about half of Renault's workforce in France and
Spain struck. The level of support was especially
noteworthy given the intensifying competition for jobs
across the European Union.
Douglas Imig and Sydney Tarrow note that the dispute
has come to an "uneasy conclusion." Renault still ended up
closing the plant but only after setting up "a more extensive
social plan for the redundant workers." 121 Nevertheless,
Renault may be brought before the European Court of
Justice, and it was chastised by the European Parliament.
A Belgium court has fined Renault 10 million Belgian
francs ($264,000) for violating labor laws which require
prior consultation and notice of major decisions to
workers. 122
Other international solidarity efforts have occurred.'23
For instance, one that followed a now fairly common
pattern involved workers at Imerys' Georgia Marble plant
in Alabama. Imerys withdrew recognition from its union
after it acquired English China Clays and combined its
nearby plant with Georgia Marble. The union, the Paper,
Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers
International Union ("PACE") organized a successful global
campaign against the Paris-based Imerys which included
the creation of a Web site, a video, and assistance from
121. Id.
122. Paul J. Deveny, World Watch: Europe/Africa: Briefly, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 23, 1998, at A16; Renault Chief Fired, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1998, at A12; see
also The Renault Case and the Future of Social Europe, at
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/1997 /03/feature/eu9703108f.html (on file with
author).
123. See, e.g., Zinn, supra note 119.
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Imerys workers in United Kingdom and France. A U.S.
delegation met with foreign workers, which led to press
conferences and rallies.
12 4
Pace has recognized that the majority of the employers
it deals with are multinational conglomerates rather than
U.S. based firms. As President Lloyd Young recently noted
in his Presidential Message in an issue of the Union's
Pacesetter, "we are resolved to match this corporate
globalization with global workers' solidarity." To accomplish
this goal, PACE has sought the assistance of foreign unions
to aid U.S. struggles as well as the strength that may come
from the formation of a global union network to share
information and take common action in the area of paper,
oil, and chemicals. Young noted that the old cry of "Workers
of the World Unite" had "new relevance as we begin the
21st century... [as] [11abor solidarity has no boundaries."'25
VI. THE PORTS OF CALL: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO
SYMPATHETIC AND SECONDARY ACTION
The solidarity actions that took place in relation to the
Neptune Jade in the United Kingdom, United States,
Canada, and Japan were probably unlawful in each
country. Indeed, most but not all legal systems prohibit
sympathetic or secondary action, whether the legal system
is based upon common or civil law, and despite differences
in history and culture. However, though the same result
may be reached, the legal route and rationale for that
conclusion may vary considerably.
A. The United Kingdom
Throughout most of the 20th century strikes in the
United Kingdom were regulated by the court-created
common law of torts and contract. There was no positive
right to strike, and, until the Thatcher period, no concept of
legal or illegal strikes. The focus of judicial inquiry was
whether the action was a tort or breach of contract, and
penalties would have affected the individual worker as well
124. Imery Workers Use 21st Century Global Tactics to Score Ongoing
Victory, PACESETTER, July-Aug. 2000, at 1.
125. Lloyd Young, A Message from the President, PACESETTER, May-June
2002, at 3.
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as the union. 12 "Industrial action is invariably a breach of
the employment contract .... [T]he employer does not
normally sue his striking employees for damages, but he
may dismiss the worker for the breach, an unthinkable
lawful power in systems with a 'right' to strike."127
The absence of positive union rights was offset to some
degree by the creation of statutory immunities from tort
liability for acts "in contemplation of a trade dispute."
Pursuant to these immunities, which are seemingly
attempts to control hostile courts as well as protect labor
activity, union actions, like strikes, have been considered a
freedom not a right, or an immunity from tort or contract
liability.2 ' Nevertheless, many believed that unions and
certainly picketing to be coercive. Hayek noted in 1960 that
"even so-called 'peaceful' picketing in numbers is severely
coercive .... [I]t represents a kind of organized pressure
upon individuals which in a free society no private agency
should be permitted to exercise." 9 These views, obviously,
ignore other aspects of picketing, e.g., its persuasive and
communicative functions. Moreover, such views reject any
notion that strikers have rights of speech and assembly
that are embodied in picketing.
Even under the applicable law prior to the Thatcher
administration, "union officials who took action to support
industrial demands by colleagues overseas risked liability,
126. Bob Hepple, The United Kingdom, in STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN
INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 183-85 (Roger Blanpain & Ruth Ben-Israel
eds., 1994).
127. LORD WEDDERBURN, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS IN BRITAIN AND EUROPE 202
(1991) [hereinafter WEDDERBURN, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS].
128. Lord Wedderburn has cautioned those in the United Kingdom pressing
for positive legal rights that such a change would not produce judicial
neutrality. Nations with statutry or constitutional recognition of union rights,
for instance, reveal considerable variation in the scope of rights. For instance,
the definition of a strike can vary widely. See id. at 74-98. A similar caution to
would-be reformers of U.S. labor law is found in James B. Atleson, Confronting
Judicial Values: Rewriting the Law of Work in a Common Law System, 45
BUFF. L. REV. 435 (1997) [hereinafter Atleson, Confronting Judicial Values].
Rachel Vorspan convincingly argues that, despite the statutory immunities,
courts on their own regulated union action, primarily picketing, through the
law of nuisance. Moreover, courts narrowly defined the statutory immunities
and made sure that nuisance picketing law was outside of the legislation.
Rachel Vorspan, The Political Power of Nuisance Law: Labor Picketing and the
Courts in Modern England, 1987-Present, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 593 (1998).
129. NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 178
(1994).
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despite the protections of the Trade Disputes Acts of 1906
and 1965."' In 1966, for instance, an injunction was
granted against three unions and two international
federations barring them from "blacking" (Aristotle
Onassis') Olympic Airways, which was then in a dispute
with its pilots' union. The injunction was based upon
interference with commercial contracts. Liability might also
arise for a conspiracy to achieve an "unlawful means," or for
inducing breach of contract, or for deliberately interfering
with contractual relations even short of inducing breach.1
3
'
The historical immunities were severely restricted by
the Thatcher government in a series of employment acts
between 1980 and 1990, now consolidated in the Trade
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act ("TULRA")
of 1992. In 1980 Parliament banned secondary or solidarity
action and picketing away from a worker's own place of
work. In 1982 the definition of "trade dispute" was
narrowed to disputes between workers and their own
employer. In addition, action to help workers in another
workplace gain union recognition or consultation rights was
prohibited. In sum, workers' influence was confined to the
their own workplaces. "[The statutes] prohibit the export of
workers' collective influence beyond the boundaries of their
own employment unit, itself defined by the employer.',
13 2
The restrictions on secondary action in the United
Kingdom are based on the notion of "enterprise
confinement," meaning that industrial action is lawful only
if limited to the employer with whom a labor dispute exists.
Thus, pressure by primary workers against a another
employer with whom the primary deals will be deemed in
breach of their contracts of employment and, thus, there
will be no tort immunity. As in other nations' laws, the
notion of the "primary" employer is drawn narrowly and
130. WEDDERBURN, LABOUR LAW AND FREEDOM, supra note 52, at 240.
131. Id. at 241.
132. WEDDERBURN, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, supra note 127, at 220; see also
PAUL LEWIS, LAW OF EMPLOYMENT: PRACTICE AND ANALYSIS 457 (1998). As Lewis
notes, picketing even at the primary location has secondary effects, but such
effects are lawful in the United Kingdom so long as the strike is in furtherance
of a trade dispute. Such a secondary effect is also lawful in the United States,
although the activity would be considered primary rather than secondary.
These restrictions significantly limited the scope of collective action because
unions had begun to direct much of their picketing in the 1970s to secondary
targets. Vorspan, supra note 128, at 677.
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defined by the "legal scope of the employment unit; even if a
dispute between one company and its employees in a group
directly affects workers in another company within the
same group. The workers in the second company cannot
take supportive industrial action."'33 In other words, the
scope of lawful economic pressure is limited to the legally
defined employment unit rather than to the zone of actual
impact or legitimate concern. Thus, even workers employed
by a subsidiary of the primary employer are deemed
neutral, non-involved workers in relation to those who work
for the parent firm. As will subsequently be discussed,
these restrictions violate ILO standards. Indeed, the ILO's
Committee of Experts has so ruled.'34
The limitations do not recognize legitimate indirect
interests of workers, let alone the more direct right to take
concerted action. Employees of company A, for example,
may not act to aid a worker's struggle at company B, even if
B is a subsidiary of A or A has taken work previously done
by B. As a result, U.K. "employers have responded to this
development by taking steps to artificially divide their
workforce, creating ostensibly separate 'buffer companies.'
"135 The ILO, meanwhile, has made it clear that "the general
banning of sympathy strikes is abusive, and workers should
be able to carry out such actions provided the initial strike
that they are supporting is legal.' '136 However, despite
repeated criticism leveled at the United Kingdom by ILO
committees, even the current Labour government does not
plan to alter the statutory limitations of the Thatcher era.'37
133. See GILLIAN MORRIS AND TIMOTHY ARCHER, COLLECTIVE LABOUR LAW
432-34 (2000).
134. Id. at 434.
135. Tonia Novitz, Freedom of Association and 'Fairness at Work'-An
Assessment of the Impact and Relevance of ILO Convention No. 87 on its Fiftieth
Anniversary, 27 INDUS. L.J. 169, 186 (1998). Novitz's citation in support is to the
wonderfully named Dimbleby & Sons Ltd v. NUJ [1984] IRLR 161. Id. at 109.
136. See Novitz, supra note 135, at 186 n.110.
137. The Labour government's Fairness at Work white paper does not deal
with the definition of a trade dispute or alter the limitations on secondary
action. Indeed, "the Foreword states simply that the days of secondary action
are over." See id. at 186.
The Labour government's Human Rights Act of 1998 implements the
government's commitment to incorporate the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law. The Act places a burden on the courts to interpret
legislation so far as possible in light of Convention rights. K.D. Ewing, however,
argues that the act will have quite limited application to worker and union
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The restriction most relevant to the Merseyside dispute
is the confinement of protected industrial actions to
disputes between workers and their own employer and at
their own place of work.138 Thus, secondary actions lost the
protection against common law civil liability and "trade
dispute" was narrowed to protect only disputes between
workers and their own employer relating to the workers'
own conditions.139 A secondary action, under the recent
legislation, will result in an injunction and tort remedies,
and a refusal to handle "hot goods" will constitute a breach
of contract by the individual employee. Even prior to the
Thatcher era statutes, disputes, in order to gain immunity
from tort law, had to be in furtherance of a "trade dispute,"
and that term was limited to a dispute between workers
and their own employer. Thus, political disputes did not
receive immunity.
British labor, however, has a long tradition of secondary
or sympathetic actions by workers not employed by the
primary or targeted employer to assist workers directly
involved. These actions are now totally outside tort and
rights. Ewing notes that the European Court of Human Rights has thus far
decided trade union rights narrowly, and, as far as the United Kingdom is
concerned, its legislation can only be enforced against a public authority. See
K.D. Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Labour Law, 27 INDUS. L.J. 275, 290-
91 (1998).
138. Trade Union & Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act, ch. 52 § 224(1)
(1992) (U.K.). Primary action, on the other hand, is defined as a situation where
the employer under the contract of employment in question is the employer
party to the dispute. Id. at § 224(5). In addition, the statute reinforces the
reluctance of courts to look behind the "veil" of incorporation to discover the
reality of control and administration. Like the United States, the immunity for
primary action is not listed simply because primary picketing has secondary
effects. Id. at § 224(3). See Hepple, supra note 126, at 181-83; see also PAUL
DAVIES & MARK FREEDLAND, KAHN-FREUND'S LABOUR AND THE LAW 321-52
(1983); K.W. WEDDERBURN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOUR LAW (1967);
R.Y.HEDGES & ALLAN WINTERBOrrOM, THE LEGAL HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM
(1930) (including a classic early history of U.K. labor law).
139. See NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER
179-80 (1994). See also 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 7, 7-39
(William L. Keller & Timothy J. Darby eds., 2002).
140. The Employment Relations Act of 1999, enacted by the Labour Party,
makes no change in the restrictive provisions of the prior Thatcher legislation
dealing with secondary pressure. See, e.g., Lord Wedderburn, Collective
Bargaining or Legal Enactment: The 1999 Act and Union Recognition, 29 INDUS.
L.J. 1 (2000); Gillian Morris, The Employment Relations Act of 1999 and
Collective Labour Standards, 17 INT'L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 63 (2001).
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contract immunity after the recent legislation.141 The
message is that employees have no legitimate interest in
aiding other workers, thus limiting the scope of disputes to
discrete workplaces. As Lord Wedderburn stated in 1985:
The collective strength of workers is to be limited by the
boundaries of their employment units. These boundaries are of
course set not by the workers of their unions, but by capital in the
private sector, and in the public sector by the state and capital
together. Industrial action in solidarity across the boundaries is
unlawful; the concept of a trade dispute is not to flow over them;
each subsidiary company in a small national or giant
multinational group is to retain its own boundaries... In today's
labor market in which a work force dreading unemployment...
face employers increasingly buttressed by transnational
connections, that represents a massive legal intervention against
the 'collective power' which.*.. is the only reality of workers'142power.
B. Canada: Common Law and Legislative Restraints
The right to strike is not constitutionally protected in
Canada, although common law restrictions in mostjurisdictions have generally given way to statutory
protection. Since the 1940s collective bargaining has been
recognized as national policy, and the right to strike is seen
as an essential part of that policy.1 43 The Canadian situation
is complex because both the federal and eleven provincial
governments regulate labor. During World War II the
federal government adopted labor legislation somewhat
similar to the Wagner Act, but its jurisdiction is limited to
federal civil servants and, in the private sector, to
141. See Trade Unions & Labour Relations (consolidation) Act 1992, ch. 52,
§ 224. BLOMLEY, supra note 139, at 185-86, 191-192.
142. R.L. Wedderburn, The New Policies in Industrial Relations Law in
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE LAW IN THE 1980s (P. Fosh & C. Littler eds.
1985), quoted in NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF
POWER 180 (1994). Reminiscent of U.S. cases in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, courts in the United Kingdom view picketing as a form of public
nuisance, coercive at least to replacement workers or as conduct which is
intimidating or bullying. See BLOMLEY, supra note 139, at 182. Cf CLYDE W.
SUMMERS, HARRY H. WELLINGTON, AND ALAN HYDE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LABOR LAW 186-89 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing judicial views in the United States).
143. See generally COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, LABOR RELATIONS
LAW IN NORTH AMERICA 64-71 (2000) [hereinafter LABOR RELATIONS LAW].
employees of what are called "federal undertakings": banks,
inter-provincial and international transporters, and
communication enterprises, for example. Thus, provincial
labor laws apply to 90% of the nation's private sector
workforce.144
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, made part of
Canada's Constitution in 1992, protects certain
fundamental rights that generally take precedence over
federal and provincial legislation. These include the right to
free speech, freedom of association, equality, and due
process. However, in three major cases in the 1980s the
Supreme Court of Canada, contrary to the ILO view, held
that freedom of association did not include the right to
strike or even the right to bargain collectively.145 "Freedom
of association was viewed as only protecting the right of
individuals to associate in activities which are lawful when
performed alone," that is, the Charter gave no rights to
unions over and above those enjoyed by the individual.146
The argument parallels arguments raised in United States
and English courts in the 19th century, but fails to consider
the effect of the apparent legality of the boycott when
individually performed.'47 The Court's decision limited the
application of the Charter to governmental bodies, but
courts applying common law were deemed not to be part of
the "government." Thus, the Charter did not apply to
"private litigation." Strike action, therefore, receives no
special constitutional protection in Canada, and such
activity is seen as properly regulated by legislation.
A distinctive aspect of Canadian labor legislation is that
a strike's legality is primarily determined by its timing. In
short, strikes are statutorily banned during the term of a
collective bargaining agreement, when disputes are
mandated to be resolved via grievance arbitration.14 In
other words, legislation accomplished in Canada what is
normally resolved by contractual no-strike clauses in the
144. See Donald Carter, Canada, in STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN
INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 39 (Roger Blanpain and Ruth Ben-Israel
eds., 1994).
145. See Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Law, Industrial Relations, and the
State, in 46 LABOUR LE TRAVAIL 251, 291 (2000); Carter, supra note 144, at 41.
146. Fudge & Tucker, supra note 145, at 291.
147. See, e.g., CHARLES GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 35-39, 52-82 (2d rev.
ed. 1961).
148. See generally LABOR RELATIONS LAW, supra note 143, at 66.
133NEPTUNE JADE20041
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
United States. Moreover, the definition of a strike normally
includes any disruption of production if carried out in a
concerted manner.
If a strike is not related to an underlying collective
bargaining purpose, if it is a political or sympathy action,
the "prevailing view in all Canadian jurisdictions is that
disruption of production and concerted employee activity by
themselves are all that is required in order for a work
stoppage to constitute a strike and be subject to the
statutory restrictions on the timing of such activity."15 °
Thus, the peace obligation is absolute, even if the dispute is
not related to the collective agreement or falls outside of the
grievance process. In U.S. terms, the obligation not to strike
during the contract's term is broader than the obligation to
arbitrate contractual issues.15" '
Picketing is regulated primarily through the law of
torts and is lawful only if the underlying strike is lawful.
Yet, even picketing in support of a lawful strike may be
deemed illegal if its impact is secondary, that is, if it has a
"disproportionate impact upon a third party unconnected to
the labour dispute."'"2 Thus, whether secondary or not, any
strike during the term of an agreement will be deemed
illegal even if the matter cannot be resolved through the
grievance process. Indirectly, therefore, the peace obligation
bars sympathetic strikes, but by a far different route than
in the United Kingdom or the United States.
Moreover, sympathy strikes and boycotts in support of
labor conflicts in other countries "require no different
149. British Columbia expressly exempts from the definition of a strike a
refusal to cross legal picket lines, but in other jurisdictions such refusals can be
deemed a strike as some aspect of concerted activity is present. See Carter,
supra note 144, at 43.
150. Id. at 43; see generally LABOR RELATIONS LAw, supra note 143, at 64-
71.
151. In all Canadian jurisdictions, the labor injunction is the basic, usually
the exclusive, civil remedy for illegal strike activity. In some jurisdictions, the
agency cease and desist order has replaced the judicial injunction. See Carter,
supra note 144, at 49-50.
152. Id. at 51. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that picketing is a
form of expression protected by the Charter, but it drastically limited the
Charter's scope to actions of the government. Significantly, a judicial injunction
is not to be treated as the act of the state. See also, Bernard Adell, Law and
Industrial Relations: The State of the Art in Common Law Canada in THE STATE
OF THE ART IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 128, 128-31 (Gerard Herbert et al. eds.
1988).
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analysis than such action totally within one Canadian
jurisdiction." Canadian law is "quite unsympathetic to
'secondary' action by employees.... 1 3 As in the United
States, public appeals to boycott products would be legal,
but such support becomes illegal if it takes the form of
striking or refusing to handle "hot goods."
What about strikes when no contract is in force? Or
what about secondary picketing? Even secondary picketing
aimed at consumers is of questionable legality. Perhaps the
most well known, or infamous, Canadian case is Hersees of
Woodstock v. Goldstein,' in which the Ontario Court of
Appeals held illegal secondary picketing aimed at inducing
consumers to boycott products made by a sportswear
company with which the union had been unable to secure a
collective bargaining agreement. Hersees, a menswear
store, objected to picket signs urging consumers to "look for
the [union] label." The court held, first, that the purpose of
the picket line was to force a breach in the contract between
Hersees and the primary employer, despite the language of
the signs and the doubtful evidence that such a contract
existed. Second, the court held that the primary purpose of
the union was to injure the plaintiff store rather than to
advance a union purpose, although the intent to harm the
plaintiff was clearly designed to strengthen its collective
bargaining demands.
The court said that even if the picketing was lawful in
the sense that it was intended to communicate information,
it should nevertheless still be restrained because it was
likely to injure the plaintiffs right to engage in its business.
"Therefore, the right, if there be such right of the
respondents to engage in secondary picketing of appellant's
premises must give way to appellant's right to trade ... ""'
As wonderfully noted by Harry Arthurs, the court made "a
leap of faith from social premise to legal result"; the court's
reasoning "therefore, . . . propels the learned judge across
the chasm which yawns between premise and result.""6
153. Brian Langille, The Canadian Law of Collective Bargaining 17
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
154. [19631 O.R. 81 (C.A.), revg [1963] O.R. 36.
155. Id. at 86.
156. Harry Arthurs, Comments, 41 CAN. B. REV. 573, 580 (1963). See also
David Beatty, Secondary Boycotts: A Functional Analysis, 52 CAN. B. REV. 388
(1974); Peter Bergbusch, Secondary Picketing in Saskatchewan: A Functional
Analysis of O.K Economyv.R.W.D.S.U., Local 454, 59 SASK. L. REV. 141 (1995).
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The vigor of the Hersees approach is seen in a 1995
decision on secondary consumer picketing by the Ontario
Court of Justice (General Division).'57 The court held that
secondary picketing is a form of expression protected by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms but, in a
reminder of U.S. rulings, the judge explicitly excluded
secondary labor consumer picketing from protection. The
court referred to a number of decisions holding such
picketing unlawful, including one from British Columbia.
There, the provincial Federation of Labor had launched a
boycott of U.S. grape imports to assist U.S. farm workers
attempting to secure decent working conditions.'58 Non-
labor picketing was different, according to an opinion cited
by the Ontario court, because it could be the exercise of the
right of freedom of expression, "whereas, union picketing
can sometimes be much more than an exercise of expression
and can trigger a work stoppage which effectively closes a
business."15 This differentiation, arguable in its own right,
does not distinguish labor from non-labor picketing when
consumers are the target.
Nevertheless, the Ontario decision held that Hersees no
longer held sway in non-labor contexts. Despite the
Canadian Supreme Court's earlier holding that the Charter
does not cover actions between private parties, 6 ° the
Ontario court noted that the Supreme Court nevertheless
held that the Charter should be used to "apply and develop
the principles of the common law in a manner consistent
with the fundamental values enshrined in the
Constitution."'' In a subsequent action for a permanent
injunction, the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)
upheld the earlier ruling, holding that there was no reason
in law or policy for restraining a consumer boycott that is
157. See Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, [1995] C.R.R. 2d 26.
Hersees has been read by a Saskatchewan Court to make secondary picketing
illegal per se; 0. K. Economy Stores v. Retail, Wholesale and Dept. Store Union,
Local 454 [1994] D.L.R. (4th) 345.
158. See Slade & Steward Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale and Dep't. Store Union,
Local 580 [1969] 69 D.L.R.(3d) 736. The order declaring all grapes imported
from California and Arizona to be "hot" was said to interfere with contracts of
service between the employees of the plaintiff and the plaintiff.
159. Daishowa, 30 C.R.R.(2d) 26, 121 (citing Halifax Antiques, Ltd. v.
Hildebrand [1985] D.L.R.(4th) 289, 297).
160. See Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin
Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.R. 573, 603.
161. Id.
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an entirely lawful form of expression not essentially
different from advertising."'
Except for the above Ontario case, labor picketing even
directed at consumers is often treated differently from non-
labor picketing, even when both are "secondary" in nature.
In British Columbia, for instance, where the Neptune Jade
was boycotted, attempts to boycott "hot cargo" have been
held to violate the province's labor statutes. If consumer
boycotts are sometimes questionable in Canada, then it is
clear that efforts to induce "neutral" employees to strike or
not handle "hot goods" are also unlawful.
There has been an undercurrent of resistance to the
Hersees' approach, however. The weakness of distinguishing
labor from other kinds of boycotts, indeed, the basic
distinction between primary and secondary activity is of
very questionable validity. Indeed, a recent decision of the
Canadian Supreme Court makes clear that secondary
action is not per se unlawful at common law, criticizing the
assumption at the heart of Hersees, on all the grounds cited
repeatedly by U.S. scholars. The Court held that all
picketing is to be protected unless it "involves a tort (a civil
wrong) or a crime (a criminal wrong)."" Furthermore, the
court held that the Charter protects free expression, and
that secondary picketing, a form of speech, cannot be
absolutely precluded by the common law.
Although the location of the picketing was not to be the
relevant focus, the Court held that the "character and
impact" of the picketing would be relevant to a tort
proceeding. It is unclear whether this means more types of
union activity will be protected given the common judicial
opposition to secondary pressure. For instance, the Court
mentioned that the interest of secondary employers will be
protected by the use of such torts as "trespass, intimidation,
nuisance and inducing breach of contract. 1 . 6" Moreover,
the Court seemed to hold that legislation, as opposed to the
162. See Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, [1998] D.L.R.(4th) 699.
163. See G.V.ADAMs, CANADIAN LABOUR LAW T 11.21-.31 (2d ed. 1996).
164. The Court indicated that other Canadian courts had taken the same
position. See Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd. v. RWDSU Local 558,
[20021 D.L.R.385. See also Bernard Adell, Secondary Picketing after Pepsi-Cola:
What's Clear, and What Isn't, 10 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 135 (2003).
165. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd. v. RWDSU Local 558, [2002]
D.L.R.(4th) 412.
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common law, could restrict the weapon." Thus, it would be
difficult, especially for a non-Canadian, to venture a guess
as to the actual effect of this decision.
C. Japan: The Scope of Dispute Acts
In Japan, where dockworkers also refused to unload the
Neptune Jade, workers can take part in "dispute acts," a
concept broader than strikes, as embodied both in post-war
legislation and in the Constitution. Article 28 of the 1947
Constitution of Japan guarantees the "right to act
collectively." The Trade Union Law ("TUL") of 1945 and the
Labor Relations Adjustment Law ("LRAL") of 1946 created
and defined the concept of a "dispute act" to set the scope of
legal protection to collective action. LRAL article 6 states
that a "labor dispute shall be defined as a disagreement
over claims regarding labor relations arising between the
parties concerned with labor relations. . . .," and article 7
states that an "act of dispute shall mean a strike, a
slowdown, a lock-out or other act or counteract hampering
the normal course of work of an enterprise, performed by
the parties concerned with labor relations with the object of
attaining their respective claims." Article 1 of the TUL,
states that one purpose of the statute is the protection of
the right of association and collective action "to encourage
the practice of collective bargaining....
Although not apparently compelled by the above
sections, it is generally believed that dispute acts "must be
aimed at achieving an objective of collective bargaining."167
166. Thus, the court stated:
If the Saskatchewan Legislature had enacted a comprehensive scheme
to govern labour disputes, then it might be argued that allowing
secondary picketing would disturb a carefully created balance of power.
In the absence of a legislative scheme, however, we find it difficult to
say that determining illegal picketing on the basis of tortious or
criminal conduct-an approach that prevailed at common law prior to
Hersees-will unduly undermine the power of employers vis-A-vis
employees.... Nothing in these reasons forestalls legislative action in
this area of the law.
Id. at 415-16. This approach parallels those opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court
that say that the First Amendment, meant to limit Congressional action, is less
important if Congress passes a statutory enactment.
167. Kazuo Sugeno, Japan: Legal Framework and Issues, in STRIKES AND
LOCKOUTS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 101, 106 (Roger Blanpain &
Ruth Ben-Israel eds., 1994); see also Tadashi Hanami and Fumito Komiya,
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Unlike the United States, Japan has no secondary boycott
provision. Nevertheless, the absence of such a provision is
of doubtful significance given the definition of a lawful
strike. Although it is difficult to find reported decisions, it is
generally believed, because dispute acts must be aimed at
achieving some collective bargaining aim, that neither
political nor sympathy strikes are permissible because they
do not involve issues resolvable with the employees'
employer.
Given the enterprise structure of Japanese unions,
however, the issue has not frequently arisen. Indeed, there
has been only one reported decision holding sympathetic
action to be unlawful. For some years the eight major coal
companies and the Kishima coal company bargained with
Tanro, an industrial union with sixty-five affiliates. In
1953, all nine coal companies joined together and locked out
their workers in anticipation of a strike by Tanro. The
situation was somewhat reversed in 1957, when after the
union at Kishima went on strike, Tanro ordered its sixty-
five affiliated unions to go on strike in support of the
Kishima union. In other words, the other unions struck the
other eight coal companies in sympathy with the Kishima
union, but this occurred in a situation in which pattern
bargaining had occurred and the coal companies had acted
jointly only four years earlier.
The eight struck companies successfully sued for
damages, and the court held that under Japan's
constitution collective action in labor disputes is allowed
only when its purpose is to improve conditions through
collective bargaining. There was no labor dispute between
Tanro and the eight companies, and it was impossible for
them to resolve the union's dispute with Kishima. Although
the Tanro union was obviously involved with a bargaining
dispute with Kishima, it apparently could not extend that
dispute to parties with whom it had no collective bargaining
"purpose." Thus, the strike was an illegal sympathy
strike.168
Dispute Acts, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 283, 283-90 (Roger Blanpain ed., 1999). See generally
JOHN PRICE, JAPAN WORKS: POWER AND PARADOX IN POSTWAR INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS (1997).
168. Information is based upon a translation of a comment on the Kishima
Tanko Roso Case by Professor Kazuo Sugano, Jurist No. 656, 1/15/78. The
decision was by the Tokyo District Court, 10/21/75. Article 28 of the Japanese
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Though the courts seem to have decided both are
unlawful, commentators in Japan are divided on the
legality of political and sympathetic actions, with the
disagreements mirroring the variety of approaches
throughout the world. Some commentators find both types
of action unlawful since they are both directed toward goals
that cannot be attained through collective bargaining.
Thus, sympathetic action, aimed at workers elsewhere, or
political action, aimed at the society's political apparatus or
state policies, are similarly unlawful. Others, however,
argue that there is a close connection between political and
economic goals and the interests of workers in different
workplaces, and they are concerned that limitations
infringe the constitutional protection for strikes. Finally,
some in this latter group would limit the legality of political
strikes to those related to the interests of workers
represented by the union taking the action.'69
Interestingly, the ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association, like the Committee of Experts, "considers the
right to strike should not be limited solely to industrial
disputes that are likely to be resolved through the signing
of a collective agreement." ' ° That is, "workers and their
organizations should be able to express in a broader
context, if necessary, their dissatisfaction as regards
economic and social matters affecting their members'
interests."17' Moreover, "a ban on strike action not linked to
a collective dispute to which the employee or union is a
party is contrary to the principles of freedom of
association."' 2  The ILO's position will be discussed
Constitution sets out three labor rights: the right to organize, to collectively
bargain, and the right to group action. My deepest thanks to Professor Makoto
Ishida of Washeda University in Tokyo for sending this case to me. Translation
occurred in the United States.
169. Kenichiro Nishimura, Labor Law, in 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN §
1.02(6)(a)(ii)(A) (2000).
170. B. Gernigon, et al., ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike, 137
INT'L LAB. REV. 441,460 (1998).
171. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF
DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE OF THE
GOVERNING BODY OF THE ILO, 484 (4th rev. ed. 1996), quoted in B. Gernigon,
et al., ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike, 137 INT'L LAB. REV. 441,
460 (1998).
172. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF
DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE OF THE
GOVERNING BODY OF THE ILO, 489 (4th rev. ed. 1996), quoted in B. Gernigon,
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subsequently, but first we turn to the nation with the most
whimsical rules on solidarity actions.
D. Secondary and Sympathetic Labor Action in the United
States
Since it is generally believed there is no constitutional
right to strike in the United States, secondary labor activity
is treated under the vague, open-textured but very
restrictive provisions of the NLRA. There are two primary
aspects of this problem in the secondary context. First, as in
Canada, courts have treated secondary labor boycotts
differently than labor-generated consumer boycotts. The
former involves attempts to urge employees of a neutral
employer to strike or restrict their labor in order to aid
workers working for the primary employer. The latter seeks
to enlist consumers of a neutral employer to boycott the
primary employer's goods or totally cease dealing with the
secondary employer. Another type of labor boycott is an
unsolicited but sympathetic strike by workers at a neutral
employer in order to support and increase the leverage of
workers at the primary employer. In short, greater
protection is granted to unions to employ pressure on a
neutral employer exerted through its consumers than
through another employer's workers.
Let us focus initially on secondary action directed at the
consumers of the secondary (or neutral) employer. One
example would be a consumer boycott directed against a
supermarket chain for carrying products of a struck firm.
Although unions have more freedom to engage in consumer
pressure, not all types of such pressure will be lawful. This
is a critical issue since a violation of the NLRA leads not
only to an injunction or cease and desist order by the NLRA
but employers can avoid the NLRB entirely and bring a
damage suit in federal court.
In significant ways, legal decisions have turned largely
on whether the secondary consumer pressure is exerted by
handbills or via a picket line. Despite its secondary nature,
labor consumer handbilling, somewhat surprisingly, has
been protected in U.S. courts. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has stated that picketing directed at
et al., ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike, 137 INT'L LAB. REV. 441,
460 (1998).
2004] 141
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
consumers is not always protected.'73 Yet, secondary
picketing is sometimes permitted; for instance, the Court
has permitted striking workers to picket a secondary site if
the union seeks only to urge consumers not to purchase the
specific products of the struck employer, rather than urging
consumers to completely cease doing business with the
secondary business. Thus, not only is secondary consumer
handbilling generally permitted, but secondary consumer
picketing, often distinguished by the Court, is sometimes
permitted. The Court's rulings on secondary labor boycotts
should be compared with the judicial reaction to quite
similar, but non-labor actions. For example, in Claiborne
Hardware, a case involving a boycott of merchants by the
NAACP seeking anti-discrimination and equal opportunity
goals, violence was threatened and, indeed, did occur. The
Court held, however, that the boycott effort was protected
as First Amendment free speech, especially in light of its
noble cause. " ' Yet, the Court excluded labor boycotts from
constitutional protection on the ground that some boycotts
were different than others: labor boycotts could be
prohibited by "Congress' striking of the delicate balance
between union freedom of expression and ability of neutral
employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from
coerced participation in industrial strife."'76 Consumer
pressure, however, is based on persuasion, not coercion,
although, as the Court stated in a subsequent decision,
picketing has aspects of violence not found in simple
handbilling.
Yet, secondary picketing, as noted above, is not
completely barred. Thus, secondary labor picketing is
sometimes deemed essentially violent in nature and,
therefore, not protected by the constitutional right of free
speech, unless the union is merely following the products of
173. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988). The Court noted that it could protect handbilling
because it was "much less effective than labor picketing." Id. at 580. Whereas
handbills "depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea," picketing exerts
"influences, and it produces consequences, different from other modes of
communication." Id. at 580 (citations omitted).
174. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760,
377 U.S. 58 (1964).
175. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
176. See Id. at 912 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447
U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980)).
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the primary employer. Moreover, labor union picketing at
the primary site is expressly protected by the NLRA.
Primary picketing, under American law, is somehow not as
potentially violent as secondary picketing, which cannot be
permitted except on some occasions. Non-Americans
puzzled at these doctrines are no more in the dark than
U.S. lawyers.
Moreover, as Claiborne Hardware makes clear, labor
action is treated differently than similar activity by non-
labor groups. Organizations like the NAACP are
constitutionally protected when they protest by either
picketing or handbilling, yet the Court has consistently
permitted the application of the secondary boycott provision
of the NLRA, section 8(b)(4)(ii), to labor's appeal to
consumers of a secondary boycott if done by picketing
rather than by handbilling."' Labor's picketing of
consumers is deemed sufficiently different than handbilling
to justify legislative prohibition, and foreclose constitutional
protection, even though non-labor groups could legally
engage in the same action. The justification for the
distinction was the age old U.S. refrain-picketing involves
the threat of force, even if there is no evidence of such a
threat and even though protected actions by the NAACP in
Claiborne actually involved both threats and actual
violence. Yet, as already noted, the Court itself recognized
the speech aspects of even consumer picketing in Fruit &
Vegetable Packers,7 ' reading or misreading the legislative
history so as to take product picketing out of the statutory
prohibition. This accommodation, which has its own First
Amendment problems, nevertheless allowed some
secondary picketing, despite the Court's later view that
picketing was inherently violent.9
177. There is voluminous literature in the United States, primarily noting
the inherent irrationality of U.S. law. For the most recent and imaginative
treatment, see Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 BUFF. L. REV.
807 (1993); GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: How IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY
SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999). The classic attempt to make sense out of
secondary boycott law is Howard Lesnick's The Gravaman of the Secondary
Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1962).
178. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377
U.S. 58 (1964).
179. The whimsicality of U.S. secondary boycott law borders on the
excessive perhaps, but one additional wrinkle is relevant here. The Court has
sometimes, but not always, referred to secondary picketing as "speech plus,"
something more than "pure" speech. The "plus" can be regulated by law without
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These decisions mean that labor action is treated
differently than actions 'by other groups, and Claiborne
Hardware rationally dispenses with the asserted "violence"
distinction. Nor is economic harm the determinative factor,
because proof of harm 'is generally not required by the
statute, and the economic damage of the boycott in
Claiborne was at least as great as the likely effect of union
inducement of consumers.
The Court at various times has employed other
justifications for its approach to union economic pressure
tactics. Thus, it sometimes has treated union picketing as a
"signal," a message to other unionized workers to cease
work, presumably enforced by internal union disciplinary
procedures. Whether this is factually true in any case is not
deemed relevant or, even if true, why the argument makes
sense is generally not explained.1"0 In any event, the
"signal" rationale has no application when the target of the
union's activity is the public and not other workers.
To begin to complete the circle of questions, the Court
has explained its Claiborne ruling by arguing that the
action of the NAACP, one having "elements of majesty," '181
was political while labor action was merely economic. The
argument responds to an earlier formulation of the First
Amendment which placed political speech higher than other
types of speech on the ladder of protection.8 2 The distinction
is questionable for a number of reasons. First, in the very
case before the Court, the goals of the NAACP included jobs
for African-Americans, surely an "economic" or at least
labor-related aim. Second, the Court has in recent years
offending the First Amendment. If you restrict the "plus" portion, of course, you
bar the "speech" part as well. In fact, it is hard to see what the "plus" is unless
it is the inherent threat of violence. But, if this is the case, then why is primary
picketing permitted? Indeed, why is some secondary labor picketing allowed?
180. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 198-203 (1985);
James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REV. 841
(1988). Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of
Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4 (1984); Note, Labor Picketing and
Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91
YALE L.J. 938 (1982).
181. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 888 (1982).
182. James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values:
Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 192 (1984)
[hereinafter Pope, Three Systems]; James G. Pope, Labor and the Constitution:
From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1074 (1987) [hereinafter
Pope, Labor and the Constitution].
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begun to weaken or eliminate the distinction between
political and economic speech and, concomitantly, the
different levels of First Amendment analysis. 8" More
significantly for this discussion, why cannot labor activity
be deemed political action? As many have argued, labor
standards and communication certainly seem to involve
public issues, and the public is the target group in
consumer boycott situations."'
But the proposed political/economic distinction was
reduced to nothing when the Supreme Court permitted the
application of the secondary boycott statute even to a
clearly political action-the withholding of labor by the
International Longshoremen's Association ("ILA") in protest
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.'85 The application of
the statute would not, said the Court, infringe upon the
First Amendment rights of the ILA and its members. "We
have consistently rejected the claim that secondary
picketing by labor unions in violation of Section 8(b)(4) is
protected activity under the First Amendment .... It would
seem even clearer that conduct designed not to
communicate but to coerce merits still less consideration
under the First Amendment."8 '
The withholding of labor, then, without even the use of
picketing, is treated as conduct "designed... to coerce....
Given this underlying belief, all other arguments by the
ILA would be unavailing. The Court was even willing to
assume that the union's aim might be "understandable and
even commendable" 7 (but not, apparently, containing
elements of "majesty" as did the NAACP's moral cause in
Claiborne), but nevertheless its action placed a burden on
neutral employers. Even a moral aim, or one aimed at
"freeing employees from handling goods from an
objectionable source,"'88 is punishable because, said the
Court's majority, a union must be responsible for the
economic consequences of its actions. Of course, all
economic pressure, even clearly legal primary strikes and
183. See Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech, supra note 180, at 950-60.
184. For a fascinating and brilliant analysis of the legal system's use of the
economic/political or public/private distinction, see Karl E. Klare, The
Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982).
185. See ILA v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
186. Id. at 226.
187. Id. at 223.
188. Id. at 224.
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picketing exerts economic pressure on other employers.
Moreover, the Court was unable to rely on the purported
violent aspects of picketing or distinguish other rulings
permitting certain types of secondary picketing. Students in
labor law classes begin to despair at this point, assuming it
has not occurred earlier.
In addition, it was irrelevant that the secondary
pressure by the ILA did not involve a primary employer
with whom the union had a dispute. In fact, in the ILA
case, there was apparently a secondary boycott with no
primary dispute! Although the actual dispute was with the
Soviet Union, the Court found that there was no exception
for politically based actions. Indeed, despite the Court's use
of the political/economic distinction in Claiborne, "the
distinction between labor and political objectives would be
difficult to draw in many cases." 9 But this is just the point.
With the Court's apparent internment of the
political/economic" distinction, interested observers in the
United States are left with no articulated rationale for the
lack of protection for secondary labor picketing (as opposed
to secondary picketing by non-labor groups), let alone for
the distinction between secondary labor handbilling and
picketing.
Not all secondary actions appeal to consumers, of
course, and the courts' apparent fear of class-based
solidarity actions would seem most engaged when a union
seeks the aid of "neutral" workers to aid them in a primary
dispute. This involves the second major branch of secondary
boycott law in the United States. This aspect involves
appeals to "neutral" workers (not consumers) to cease all or
some work in order to aid workers involved in a strike or
dispute in another firm or even the unsolicited decision by
the neutral workers to aid workers employed elsewhere. A
union clearly may not appeal to neutral workers to cease
work either completely or, at a minimum, not to work on
"hot goods." Nor may the neutral workers cease work on
their own, unbidden by the striking union, for this would be
a "strike" with the forbidden object within section 8(b)(4)(i).
There is a narrow exception for cases in which the alleged
neutral has actually involved itself in the dispute, for
instance, by accepting work which would have been
performed by the strikers. Outside of very narrow limits,
189. Id. at 225.
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however, workers have no right to seek aid from neutrals or
take sympathetic action via the withholding of labor.
Unlike the consumer area, these forms of secondary activity
do not generate nearly as much ambiguity.
Workers for neutral employers, it is traditionally said,
have no dispute with their own employer, that is, they have
no primary dispute with their own employer which would
justify their work stoppage. Their own interests, of course,
are not really of judicial significance, and the courts seem to
rely on the early common law notion that one needs some
self interest to justify the causing of economic harm.19 ° As
under the common law, courts decide for themselves
whether unions have sufficient interest to exert economic
pressure. Moreover, to argue that secondary workers have
no interest in disputes elsewhere or in the work they
perform is historically wrongheaded. Not only are workers
concerned with those in other firms, but workers personally
may feel morally or politically offended by being forced to
handle or work on struck goods. In addition, their work on
"hot goods" may well weaken the strike effort. It could fairly
be argued, therefore, that these workers indeed have a
dispute with their employer since they are required-upon
pain of discharge-to do work which violates their sense of
integrity.91
International cooperation may involve the withholding
of labor or inducing others to do so, rather than an appeal
to consumers. Without presenting courts with the
embarrassment of explaining why appeals to consumers
should be treated differently based on the identity of the
speaker, appeals to workers seem to face an uphill battle in
countries like the United States and Canada. Neither
country has approved a distinction between political and
190. Self interest, however, can be defined narrowly or broadly. Narrow
approaches were taken by some courts, for instance, by Massachusetts's courts.
See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). Not all state courts,
however, read self interest so narrowly, and at least one state, New York,
permitted even secondary actions since self interest was clearly involved so long
as labor action did not fall into any existing category of tort or crime. See
GREGORY, supra note 147, at 76-82.
191. Even aside from the NLRA secondary boycott provisions, such action
has traditionally been treated by American courts as unprotected action which
could lead to discharge or discipline. See e.g., JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND
ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 44-66 (1983) [hereinafter ATLESON,
VALUES].
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economic strikes; indeed, the distinction has generally been
rejected. This assumes, of course, that some rational
distinction can be made between economic and political
aims. In any case, in both Canada and the United States
the primary emphasis is placed upon the protection of
neutral employers.192 It is at this point that courts make a
fundamental choice between two views of neutrality.
Unions and their members may well believe that firms
which continue to work on goods from a struck firm or
continue to supply such companies are less than "neutral."
Unions may well believe in that saying of the 1960s, "if
you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem."
After all, what unions are generally trying to achieve is a
fully effective strike, one that ends production at the struck
firm. Should that be achieved, there is obviously no
production upon which workers at other firms can work.'93
Unlike most other countries, the United States actually
has had cases involving international solidarity actions.
The most noteworthy recently have dealt with the legality
of secondary action outside the United States whose purpose
was to benefit unions in the United States. Two courts of
appeals have reached opposite conclusions on the legality of
the union's action. Unsurprisingly, this dispute again
involved longshoremen, this time the East Coast ILA. As
part of an ongoing dispute between ILA-represented
longshoremen and two unorganized Florida shippers,
Japanese longshore unions were asked to aid the union by
refusing to unload ships in Japan which had been loaded by
nonunion workers in Florida. When Japanese workers
refused to unload such cargoes, the targeted exporters and
shipping companies redirected their ships to ports using
192. A further irony is that under the Railway Labor Act, which preceded
the NLRA and covers airlines as well as railways, secondary boycotts by unions
are permitted. See, e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of
Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429 (1987).
193. See CLYDE SUMMER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 488
(1982) [hereinafter LABOR LAW]. The secondary boycott prohibitions in the
United States have been vigorously criticized. See CHARLES CRAVER, CAN
UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 145-
46 (1993); PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 272-73 (1990); Dorothy Sue Cobble, Making Post
Industrial Unionism Possible, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR
LAW 285, 297 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994); Marion Crain, Between
Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex Equality, and Labor
Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1996-99 (1994).
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union labor for loading. This is, then, a case of international
labor solidarity.
Prior to a ruling on the merits of the employers' unfair
labor practice charge, the NLRB sought an injunction in
federal court under section 10(1) of the NLRA, another
provision aimed at suppressing secondary activity, on the
ground that the secondary boycott actually occurred in the
United States as it was directed at U.S. firms and the
economic pain was felt in Florida. The 11th Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the injunction, holding that the application
of the statute was not extraterritorial and, moreover, the
action of the Japanese unions could be attributed to the ILA
based on legal doctrines of agency, ratification or joint
venture. 194
Subsequently, after the NLRB held on the merits that
the ILA's actions constituted a violation of NLRA section
8(b)(4), the court of appeals for the District of Columbia
held that there was no illegal secondary boycott for a
variety of reasons, including the belief that the action was
not taken by "employees" within the Act, since the Japanese
were not individuals engaged in "commerce" as defined by
the NLRA. The court also denied the applicability of agency
or ratification doctrines, while not clearly focusing on the
interesting issue of the possible application of the NLRA
beyond U.S. borders.
The 11th Circuit's decision, which upheld the
temporary injunction, was based upon a quite credible
argument. American anti-trust law, for instance, already
applies to anti-competitive agreements even though made
abroad if the effects are felt in the United States.9 The
ILA, on the other hand, argued that the boycott, the actual
refusal to unload the ships, occurred in Japan by Japanese
workers who were clearly not covered by the U.S. statute,
and that clearly was factually true. Yet, the application of
the statute would have been clear if all activity had
occurred in the United States, for the statute would then
194. See Dowd v. ILA, 975 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1992).
195. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four
Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 1011-
19 (1995); Christopher Nickson, The Extraterritorial Application of Section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author); see also Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational
Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 N.W. L. REV.
598 (1990).
14920041 NEPTUNE JADE
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
have applied to the workers either doing the actual
boycotting or encouraging them to so act. Does it make
sense to separate where the action occurs from where the
pain, the injury for which the statute was passed, occurs?
Yet, it is clear that no U.S. based remedial action could
have been taken against Japanese longshore workers.
Nevertheless, a strike in the United States in aid of
striking or locked-out workers in another county is likely to
be treated as an illegal secondary boycott, leading initially
to an injunction by the NLRB via section 10(1) of the NLRA
and subsequently to a cease and desist order after a ruling
on the merits. In addition, the NLRA permits employers to
seek damages directly in federal court. The secondary
boycott provision in the NLRA covers strikes to induce a
"person" (generally an employer) to cease dealing with
another "person." Given the Court's ruling in the ILA's
boycott against the Soviet Union, the moral basis of the
workers' actions are less important than the effects.
Throughout U.S. labor history, courts have preferred
narrow economic forms of labor action over broader, more political
forms. In the eyes of most judges, legitimate collective action is
narrowly self interested rather than altruistic, directed at
maximizing pecuniary awards rather than influencing the 'basic
scope of the enterprise,' and confined to the immediate employer-
employee relationship rather than involving outside workers and
communities. The paradigm of a lawful labor dispute is the strike
for higher wages by employees of a single employer.196
The prohibitions in U.S. law ignore a number of factors.
For instance, the law deems irrelevant the interest that the
"secondary" actors may have in the primary dispute. Unlike
the explicit recognition in the anti-injunction Norris-
LaGuardia Act that workers do have an interest in other
workplaces,'97  there is no assumption in NLRAjurisprudence that workers in the same union or industry
are "interested" in the dispute. Moreover, the purposes of
the boycott are also treated as irrelevant. Third, also not
considered are the resources and power of the union which
organized the boycott. For example, a union may be too
196. James G. Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old
Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L.J. 889,
916-17 (1991).
197. 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1998)).
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weak vis-a-vis an employer to mount an effective strike. As
a consequence, the prohibitions remove a possibly effective
weapon from unions and affect the resulting balance of
power.'98 Fourth, as already noted, the restrictions ignore
the personal and, thus, primary objections workers may
have to working on "hot goods." In any event, the ability to
strike effectively is the foundation upon which U.S. labor
relations law rests. The viability of the strike and boycott
are, therefore, crucial to the goal of industrial democracy.
The saga of the Neptune Jade may raise special issues,
but there is little reason to believe the result would have
been different had the statute been invoked. After all, in
the Soviet Union case, the Court found a secondary boycott
even though there did not seem to be any primary dispute.
Moreover, the language of the act clearly was designed to
prohibit sympathetic action, and it is not clear why it
should matter that the workers being supported are citizens
of another country.
VII. THE RISKS OF SYMPATHETIC ACTION FOR POLITICAL
ACTORS
The Neptune Jade incident raised at least two other
interesting issues under U.S. law. First, the protesters at
the Oakland, California, docks were union members,
activists, a few IWW members (who had learned of the
arrival of the Neptune Jade by e-mail), and other groups
including the Laney College Labor Society. The protesters
were sued by the Pacific Maritime Association ("PMA"),
arguably in the nature of "SLAPPS" suits.'99 The stevedores,
it seems, respected a picket line but, apparently, did not
initiate it. This kind of "non-labor union" picket line is
198. OTTO KAHN-FREUND & BOB HEPPLE, LAWS AGAINST STRIKES 33-34
(1972) [hereinafter KAHN-FREUND].
199. "SLAPPS" stands for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.
See The First Amendment Project, The Anti-SLAPP Resource Center, available
at www.firstamendment.org/ antislappresourcecenter.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2004).
This action highlights what is reported to be a more militant litigation
strategy by the PMA to bring unfair labor practice and damage actions against
the union, which they feel is abusing the traditional arbitration system. Bill
Mongelluzzo, Internal Arbitration Thrown Overboard; Work Stoppage Disputes
Now May Prompt Suits, J. COM., Dec. 18, 1997, at A12 [hereinafter
Mongelluzzo, Overboard].
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apparently protected under the First Amendment by
Claiborne Hardware, but the defendants incurred
significant legal costs fighting the PMA action. No action
was brought against the ILWU, raising the question
whether the stevedores could respect this line as an aspect
of their rights of free speech. That is, if the picketing, like
that in Claiborne Hardware is constitutionally protected,
why should respecting such a picket line result in legal
penalties?
The defendants in Oakland argued that their picket
line was a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment and the workers had simply honored a
peaceful picket line. The PMA, on the other hand, argued
that the longshore workers "were intimidated and
threatened by demonstrators who illegally conspired to
interfere with the ship's business and defied a court
order.""2 ° The action by the PMA, joined by Yusen Terminals
and Centennial Stevedoring Services, was filed against two
leading demonstrators, three pro-labor groups, including
the Peace and Freedom Party, students in the Laney
College labor group, and a number of unnamed individuals.
Plaintiffs filed discovery motions seeking the names of
anyone connected with the pickets and the membership
lists and minutes of meetings of all unions and
organizations involved, including all correspondence, faxes,
and e-mails. °1
Robert Remar, an attorney who represented one union
activist defendant who had participated in the picket line,
noted that the companies were "worried that political and
labor issues that have broad-based concern for the
community do not get expressed by average citizens in the
form of demonstrations on the docks. The companies are
very unhappy that they and any other institution are
subject to First Amendment activities."2 2 The suit led to a
series of protest demonstrations, and at least two songs
200. Rick Del Vecchio, Dockworkers to Protest Industry, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
20, 1998 at A20 [hereinafter Del Vecchio, Dockworkers to Protest]; Jim Lamb,
Oakland Lawsuit Sparks Day-long Protest, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Feb. 25, 1998, at
3.
201. Id.
202. Rick Del Vecchio, Longshore Workers to Protest Lawsuit Attack on
Rights, Say Union Leaders, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 1998, at A19 [hereinafter Del
Vecchio, Attack on Rights].
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were written commemorating the Neptune Jade saga. °3 In
July, 1998, longshore workers shut down the Port of
Oakland during the day a court was hearing the union's
motion to block the PMA attempt to acquire documents to
provide information on the participants in the picketing of
the Neptune Jade. °4
The PMA's manager of operations and development,
Josephine Parr, explaining why the company sued the
demonstrators, stated that the company's action did not
concern labor-management relations but, rather, the nature
of the shipping industry and the individuals who had acted
illegally." The suit, she said, focused less on the legality of
the picket line itself and more on the manner it was carried
out. Parr stated that the picketers "blocked the entrance to
the terminal and had cars and railroad ties and things like
that. Another space was provided for them to demonstrate,
but they didn't use it." Parr also claimed that some of the
pickets threw bottles and distributed leaflets that said
"[c]rossing a picket line can be hazardous to your health."
206
The president of the PMA, Joseph Miniace, also rejected
the First Amendment argument on the ground that the
demonstrators "were threatening the safety of our
workforce." °7 Although the precise facts may not be clear, it
seems doubtful that the picketers were "threatening" the
longshoremen, a group not generally known for excessive
passivity. Nevertheless, the PMA's suit threatened a
strategy advanced by some to form union-community
alliances to take advantage of the First Amendment rights
of non-labor groups."'
Relying upon the First Amendment, an Alameda
County Superior Court judge dismissed the PMA action
203. See, e.g. Rick Del Vecchio, Supporters of Labor Rally Against Ship
Industry, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 1998 at A21; Jim Lamb, 'Neptune Jade' Lawsuit
Protest, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Feb. 28, 1998, at 1. See Appendix, infra, for songs.
204. Bill Mongelluzzo, Dockworkers Refuse to Work in Oakland, J. COM.,
July 23, 1998, at 12A; Bill Mongelluzzo, Oakland Walkout Over Issues Remain,
J. CoM., July 24, 1998, at llA.
205. Del Vecchio, Dockworkers to Protest, supra note 200, at A21.
206. Jim Lamb, U.S. Dockers Win Ruling on 'Jade' Dispute: Court Gives
Split Decision on Union Bid to Quash Lawsuit over NOL Ship, LLOYD'S LIST
INT'L, Mar. 14, 1998.
207. Del Vecchio, Dockworkers to Protest, supra note 200, at A21.
208. James Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor
Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889
(1991).
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against Jack Heyman, an executive board member of Local
10 of the Inland Boatmen's Union, and the Labor Party's
Golden Gate Chapter, granting attorney's fees, but
permitted the action to continue against Robert Irminger,
an informal picket line captain and a member of the Inland
Boatmen's Union, and against the Peace and Freedom
Party. After Laney College refused a PMA subpoena for
names, the Laney College Labor Studies Group was also
dropped as a defendant. According to reports, a judge in a
different proceeding apparently ruled that the picketing
was peaceful but in violation of an injunction limiting the
pickets to four, and then assessed only a $100 fine or two
days of community service.2 °9
In late November, 1998, the PMA dropped its
remaining action in the Neptune Jade dispute. With new
contract negotiations coming up, such an action may have
seemed like the wisest choice. Robert Irminger deemed the
action a "humiliating defeat," although the effect of the
yearlong action cannot be measured. 1° The costs of the
PMA's litigation may hinder non-labor action in the future,
no doubt its intended purpose.
But even when community action does occur, another
serious obstacle to transnational labor action arises, even
apart from the secondary boycott laws. Taking the Neptune
Jade situation as an example, the ILA, like most unions,
agreed to a no-strike clause in its collective agreement. The
legal question then focuses upon the scope of the clause, for
if the action respecting the picket line violates the union's
no-strike clause, the union can be both enjoined and sued
for damages.211 Moreover, Supreme Court decisions have
made it clear that even without a no-strike clause,* or
despite the breadth of such a clause, a strike over a matter
that can be resolved by arbitration is a breach of contract
which can lead to either an injunction or damages under
209. Lamb, supra note 206; Henry Lee, Part of Ship Protest Suit Rejected,
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 1998, at A19; E-mail from Michael Eisenscher to James
Atleson, Professor, University at Buffalo (May 8, 1998) (on file with author).
210. Labor Victory in Settlement of the Neptune Jade Case PMA Drops All
Suits Against Defendants, Labor Network Archives, available at
www.labournet.org/ docks/98 1/neptune2.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
211. Atleson, The Circle of Boys Market, supra note 74.
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NLRA section 301.212 In this type of case, however, there is a
good argument that the dispute, since it does not involve
the terms of the contract, is not a violation of the
arbitration clause. 13 Nevertheless, unions must give serious
consideration to the costs of litigation. Given the PMA's
litigation effort in recent years, the threat of litigation poses
a serious threat for the union. As Steve Stallone, editor of
the ILWU's Dispatcher noted, "[cilearly, we don't have
millions of dollars. 214
The law in this area is not clear although some courts
have read no-strike clauses broadly.' The Supreme Court
however, in a relatively old decision, Mastro Plastics ,21
9
interpreted no-strike clauses as barring only strikes over
contractual, work place issues, and, therefore, such clauses
did not bar a strike over unfair labor practices.21 '7 The
union's likely argument, therefore, is that secondary or
sympathetic actions also do not involve the parties'
collective agreement, an ironic application of the belief that
sympathetic actions do not actually involve the primary
employment relationship. The continuing viability of this
decision, however, is in doubt since the Court has permitted
damage and injunction actions to enforce arbitration
clauses, when the causes of strikes could have been
arbitrated. Given the Court's demonstrated affinity for
enforcing at least its view of arbitration clauses, Mastro
Plastics may be seen as an anomaly or, possibly, no longer
much of an asset for unions. Yet, a "strike" over a foreign
212. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Boys
Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See, e.g.,
Atleson, The Circle of Boys Market, supra note 74, at 106.
213. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). A different
situation may exist, however, if the employer can grieve under the parties'
collective agreement.
214. Bill Mongelluzzo, Internal Arbitration Thrown Overboard; Work-
Stoppage Disputes Now May Prompt Suits, J. COM., Dec. 18, 1997, at 12A.
215. Reversing its earlier position, the NLRB held in 1985 that a generally
worded no-strike provision barred sympathetic action. See Alvin Goldman, The
USA, in STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 208, 217-
18 (Roger Blanpain & Ruth Ben-Israel eds., 1994).
216. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
217. The NLRB, however, has limited Mastro Plastics to apply only to
strikes over serious unfair labor practices.
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dispute or one over a foreign nation's politics generally
cannot be arbitrated under most contracts.218
VIII. THE ANALYTIC PROBLEMS OF LEGAL DOCTRINES
Although the domestic law of most developed nations,
in line with ILO rules, may protect strikes in general,
strikes in certain situations may not be protected. Strikes
may violate specific statutory prohibitions or, as in the
United States, court-created, implicit contractual bars to
certain strikes.219 Obviously, restrictive rules and statutes
hinder solidarity actions and limit the ability of unions to
respond to the new global world."' As we have seen,
statutes in some countries have not altered the common law
hostility to sympathetic or secondary actions, even directed
at consumers. Other countries confine protected strikes to
the specific workplace in which the dispute occurred. Thus,
in all the countries in which the boycott against the
Neptune Jade occurred, the refusal to unload the ship was
unlawful and perhaps a breach of contract as well. The
story thus far, therefore, is that domestic legal restrictions
provide serious obstacles to transnational labor activity,
although unlawful action will nevertheless occur. The
practical effect of such legislation, in Lord Wedderburn's
words, "is to fragment and inhibit trade union action while
the power of internationalized capital is constitutionally
guaranteed the maximum flexibility."2
2
218. A report, however, indicates that an arbitration proceeding did occur
under the PMA/ILWU agreement, with the arbitrator initially ruling that the
presence of pickets created unsafe working conditions, and, thus, the ILWU did
not have to cross the picket line. Bill Mongelluzzo, ILWU Protest May Disrupt
Oakland, J. COM., Feb. 26, 1998, at 10A. That ruling was, however, reversed the
following day.
219. In an important U.S. Supreme Court decision, strikes are unlawful if
they involve matters that could be resolved by the grievance process even in the
absence of a no-strike clause. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414
U.S. 368 (1974). See James Atleson, Threats to Health and Safety: Employee
Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REV. 647 (1975) [hereinafter Atleson,
Threats to Health and Safety].
220. There also may be specific legislation that prohibits or hampers the
ability of national workers' organizations to affiliate with international
confederations. See WORLD LABOUR REPORT 1997-1998, supra note 7, at 37-38.
221. NATIONALISM AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 256 (H.R. Hahlo et
al. eds., 1973). In the United States, at least, this is not surprising. U.S. courts
and the NLRB have already made it difficult for unions to deal with multi-unit
and multiple-location firms and, especially, to respond to the economic power of
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Interestingly, whatever the domestic labor law scheme,
similar questions tend to arise. For instance, can the
collective action be deemed a strike? The answer might
seem to be obvious, but this has not proved to be the case.
Usually, the answer is affected by the reason the question is
asked. Since strikes are generally protected in western
nations, as well as by ILO documents, the issue often
involves whether the pressure device falls within the scope
of legal protection. Yet, not all strikes are protected, and
certain "strikes" or work stoppages may be illegal under a
statute because of their purpose or their timing.
Moreover, such action may not violate a statute but
nevertheless be unprotected in the sense that participants
may be discharged. In the United States, for instance,
certain strikes have been found to fall outside the broadly
worded protection of sections 7 and 13 of the NLRA because
they violate what the courts believed to be implicit policies
imbedded in the act, e.g., strikes or collective actions which
violated other federal statutes or the policy insuring respect
for the integrity of collective bargaining agreements. Other
collective actions short of a full withdrawal of labor, such as
sit-downs, slowdowns or intermittent strikes, have also
been held unprotected, although the arguments for these
decisions are far from clear.222 Although unprotected actions
in the United States are not necessarily statutory violations
leading, for instance, to an injunction or cease and desist
order, the threat of discharge may be just as effective as a
deterrence. Similar restraints exist in other nations. In
France and Belgium, for instance, the slow down or "work
to rule" action is unlawful because there is no cessation of
work. '23 In other words, such limited actions are not deemed
strikes. They are not a "concerted cessation" of labor but
instead are seen as a "defective execution of work."
224
conglomerates. Unions, like national governments and communities, tend to
face the same problems of relative power and lack of information. I raised some
of these questions in an article some years ago, and they are obviously still alive
today. James Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REV.
841 (1985).
222. ATLESON, VALUES, supra note 191, at 44.
223. Jacque S. Rojot, France, in STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS IN INDUSTRIALIZED
MARKET ECONOMIES 57 (Roger Blanpain & Ruth Ben-Israel eds., 1994); Roger
Blanpain, Belgium, in STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET
ECONOMIES 34 (Roger Blanpain & Ruth Ben-Israel eds., 1994).
224. WEDDERBURN, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, supra note 132, at 87-88, 287-88.
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Germany and Sweden, on the other hand, protect such
actions as "strikes."
Thus, at some times the union ironically desires the
collective action to be considered to be something other than
a strike because strikes may be legally or contractually
barred.225 Indeed, the most serious obstacle to secondary or
sympathetic action may be explicit statutory prohibitions
such as the secondary boycott provisions in U.S. law.
A. Is There Any Way to Rationally Distinguish Primary
From Secondary Strikes?
Solidarity and sympathy strikes logically direct us to an
examination of the workers' interests. All European
systems, other than the United Kingdom, "reserve some
area of legality for solidarity or sympathetic action of some
kind."2  U.S. courts, on the other hand, have long
disfavored labor boycotts, often viewing such actions as
predictable preludes to violence.227 In the late 19th and
early 20th centuries even picketing at a primary site was
typically viewed as violent or at least potentially So.228 Yet, a
strike is merely a labor boycott-the workers stop working
for the employer with whom they have a dispute. This
action may have secondary effects, disrupting production
and, thus, disturbing the normal interactions between the
primary employer and other firms doing business with it.
Indeed, one of the purposes of a picket line at the primary
site is to urge workers employed by other firms to respect
the line and, thereby, induce other employers to "cease
dealing with" the struck employer. Although this activity is
clearly protected under the NLRA, and not violative of the
secondary boycott provision, the activity falls within the
broad language of the statutory provision.
225. Similarly, unions may want a job action to be deemed not a strike since
strikes may be prohibited by a contractual no-strike clause, but, instead, an
action protected by NLRA section 502, which protects the "quitting" of labor in
response to substantial risks to health and safety. See Atleson, Threats to
Health and Safety, supra note 219.
226. WEDDERBURN, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS supra note 132, at 296.
227. See Dianne Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence, 1894-
1921, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1989).
228. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896). For a listing
of various early and often colorful judicial views on picketing, see LABOR LAW,
supra note 193, at 186-89.
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Thus, all primary picket lines have secondary effects,
and the real task of the law in the United States is to
distinguish between types of secondary effects and not
between primary and secondary activity. Generally,
picketing at "neutral" firms who do business with the
struck firm is a violation of the statute, even though the
effect on the alleged neutral would be the same as a strike
and legitimate, primary picket line which forces the struck
employer to close during the strike. In such situations, of
course, there are no "hot goods" for the secondary employer
to handle or work on.
The intellectual problem is that all strikes have
secondary effects, which most of the time are intentional.
Thus, a perfectly legal primary picket line and strike is
usually intended to keep away neutral truck drivers or
others dealing with the primary employer. Moreover, to
complicate the situation, in the United States not all strike
activity at a secondary location is prohibited.229 Yet, most
attempts to induce workers at other firms to aid the
strikers will run afoul of the statute. Just as important,
even without a secondary picket line, workers at other firms
may not legally strike in aid of workers elsewhere, even
though the work they do helps the struck employer
continue operating during the strike.23 °
The normal argument is that the workers taking the
sympathetic or secondary action have no real dispute with
their own employer and, thus, are causing a neutral
employer to suffer economic harm unfairly. A common
response by the critics of legal restrictions is that "outsiders
may well stand to lose or benefit by the outcome of the
dispute."231 That is, the target of the secondary pressure
may have an economic interest in the labor conditions at
the primary employer. Moreover, the employees at the
secondary site may have a personal interest in the labor
conditions at the primary site.
In any case, an argument challenging the traditional
view exists: if an employer insists that workers handle
229. Workers may, for instance, picket another employer who performs
work during the strike which the strikers would otherwise perform. See Douds
v. Local 231, Metro. Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
230. Underlying this situation is the U.S. rule that strikers can be
permanently replaced, although firing alone would constitute discrimination
under the statute. See ATLESON, VALUEs, supra note 191, at 48-49.
231. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 198, at 31.
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cargo which the workers find inconsistent with their
principles, usually called "hot cargo," either because they
wish to aid workers elsewhere or to express political
revulsion about the source of the "hot goods," why is this
not deemed a primary and not a secondary strike? In other
words, when workers refuse to work on "hot goods" in order
to aid workers elsewhere, can it be said that they have no
real dispute with their employer? The workers' boycott, that
is, the withholding of their labor, may well be based on
deeply held beliefs. The answer, no doubt, lies in the limited
status courts assign to workers, a status revealed in cases
in which workers seek to control some aspect of their
work.32 Why is this type of action more important than a
strike to obtain higher wages or, as in the United States,
the right to handbill consumers? One could certainly argue
that the right to dispose of your labor, especially to defend
or assist others, is a more keenly felt and significant
interest than the right to persuade consumers how to spend
their money.
Yet, on the ground that sympathy or secondary strikes
affect employers not in a position to satisfy worker
demands, a number of countries bar such solidarity efforts.
As noted earlier, Japan and, in particular, the United
Kingdom limit the legality of strikes to those connected to
collective bargaining.2" A strike for wholly "political
purposes" is not a protected "trade dispute" in the United
Kingdom because statutes define the term as involving only
industrial matters.
On the other hand, this is not a uniform position. A
number of European nations protect solidarity strikes if the
sympathetic workers can demonstrate a sufficient interest
with the primary workers, although the definition and
scope of "interest" may vary and may be tested objectively
or subjectively. Italian courts, for instance, have held
solidarity actions to be protected so long as workers are
232. Decisions have long held that workers may not stay at work and decide
which parts of their work or assigned tasks they will perform. Similarly,
slowdowns are not protected. See ATLESON, VALUES, supra note 191, 44-45, 52.
233. New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act of 1991 makes all secondary
and sympathetic strikes unlawful in this way. The recently elected center-left
government has enacted an Employment Relations Act which alters some of the
provisions of the prior legislation but makes no change in this prohibition. See
Gordon Anderson, Modest But Progressive Reforms, 7 INT'L UNION RTs. 6, 6-7
(2000).
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acting in defense of what they perceive to be their interest
in the primary dispute. '34 The demands of striking workers,
therefore, must be related to their employment but need not
be aimed primarily at the workers' own employer. Spain,
Ireland, and France take a similar position, and in Belgium
sympathy strikes are lawful unless contrary to an absolute
231peace obligation. 3 Indeed, except for political strikes,
"industrial conflict is characterized by the almost complete
freedom to engage in industrial warfare.... 236
Many countries, including Germany, take the position
that industrial action can only legally be started when the
goal is to conclude a collective agreement. Therefore, only
parties to such an agreement can engage in industrial
action, making political as well as sympathy strikes illegal.
According to Manfred Weiss, the extent to which solidarity
strikes were lawful was in doubt until a 1985 decision of
234. The right to strike is protected in the Italian Constitution of 1948 but
only if exercised within the law. The only statute dealing with strikes, however,
deals with public employees, so the private sector is regulated by case law.
Workers may strike to pursue collective economic interests but also political or
other interests. Consequently, "the pursuit of any interest relevant to the
working environment or the economy in general is a legitimate goal of a strike.
Thus, solidarity strikes in support of a strike by other groups of workers have
been held to be legitimate." Similarly, political strikes are legal, but only if they
relate to some interest of a group of workers. See 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAWS 5-34 (William L. Keller ed., 1997).
235. See WEDDERBURN, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, supra note 127, at 293-96;
Roger Blanpain, Belgium, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW
& INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1, 393 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2002) [hereinafter
Blanpain, Belgium].
The issue in France turns on the definition of the scope of the right to strike.
Strikes are protected by the French constitution, but, as in most countries,
courts have created limits to the right's expression. Courts may decide on the
"disproportionality" between the aims of the strike and the disruption it causes.
Second, and relevant here, courts decide whether strikes are
"extraprofessional"-that is, not related to the employer-employee relationship.
If so found, the actions are treated as illegal regardless of motive. Strikes for
purposes other than the protection of workers' own interests are not allowed.
Therefore, political strikes are considered unlawful, but sympathy strikes
(gre've de solidarite') are protected if the courts find that the two groups of
workers have common interests. It is asserted generally that French courts
"have on the whole been prepared to recognize the legitimacy of sympathetic
strikes." KAHN-FREUND, supra note 193, at 31; see also Rojot, supra note 223, at
3-26; MICHEL DESPAX & JACQUES ROJOT, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN FRANCE 295-96 (1987).
236. See ROGER BLANPAIN, LABOUR LAW IN BELGIUM 284 (1996); Blanpain,
Belgium, supra note 223, at 388.
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Germany's Federal Labor Court.237 Although such strikes
are still allowed in a narrow range of cases, such as those
involving an alleged neutral that has taken over production
from the struck employer or when it could be said the two
employers were the same entity, the exceptions are far too
limited to "allow solidarity strikes to become a relevant
feature of industrial conflict in Germany."23" Although based
upon a quite different legal system than the United States,
legal results are similar in the two countries.
Some nations, on the other hand, have recognized and
protected labor boycotts even in a transnational context.
Sweden, for example, has recognized the union right to
engage in this type of solidarity action.9 Such actions are
lawful so long as they do not violate any peace obligation in
the union's contracts, where the union acts in accordance
with its own rules, and where the initial strike is itself
lawful. Indeed, even these restrictions have been relaxed if
the first strike occurs abroad. In a case involving a strike to
support a boycott of goods from post-coup Chile, for
instance, the Swedish Labor Court noted that Swedish
workers have no opportunity to influence the social policies
of another nation where the dispute originated. 4 ° Similarly,
Greece amended its labor laws in 1982 to protect
sympathetic action, and unions have a right to take such
action against multi-national firms where action abroad can
affect domestic working conditions. 241 The most extreme
example of the recognition of solidarity strikes is Denmark,
where such actions are protected so long as they are
altruistic, even when they violate the peace obligation.
Altruism means "[s]econdary strikers must not have a
material interest of their own in the primary dispute. ,242
237. See Germany, in 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 4-50 (2003).
238. Manfred Weiss, Federal Republic of Germany, in 6 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA
FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1, 173 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2000)
[hereinafter Weiss, Federal Republic]; MANFRED WEISS, LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 155 (1987)
[hereinafter WEISS, LABOUR LAW]; GUNTER HALBACH ET. AL., LABOUR LAW IN
GERMANY: AN OVERVIEW 322-34 (1994).
239. Ruth Ben-Israel, Strikes, Lockouts and Other Kinds of Hostile Actions,
in 15 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 15-1, 15-6 (Bob A.
Hepple ed., 1973).
240. WEDDERBURN, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, supra note 127, at 293-94.
241. Id. at 300.
242. Id. at 294.
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These decisions may support an argument that
transnational solidarity actions should be protected even if
such pressure, when all actions are domestic, is not.
Looking at private international conflicts of law rules, it
is generally accepted that the legality of strikes can only be
determined according to the law of the place where such
action occurs. 243 The legality of international boycotts and
sympathetic actions is far less clear. Morgenstern, writing
in 1984, suggests that some Western nations may permit
local boycotts intended to aid workers in other countries.244
The legality of sympathetic actions, like that of strikes, is
usually determined by the law of the place where the
sympathy action occurs. Morgenstern suggests that some
protection for such actions exists as she notes that legality
will depend on the domestic law regulating sympathetic
action in general: "the most usual requirements in that
respect being that the strike being supported must itself be
lawful and that the sympathy action must have direct
connection with it."2 45 There may, however, be special rules
dealing with the support of foreign strikes and the manner
in which the general restrictions are applied to foreign
situations. As Morgenstern notes, however, court decisions
in "support of foreign strikes are isolated and relatively
old. .. , 46
ILO consulates have issued decisions supporting the
views of nations which recognize the validity of solidarity
actions. The ILO Committee of Experts, for instance, in a
decision dealing with the Thatcher government's
proscription of secondary action, found that the statutes
provided "excessive limitations" upon the right to strike.
The U.K. statutes, the Committee stated:
[A]ppear to make it virtually impossible for workers and unions
lawfully to engage in any form of boycott activity, or 'sympathetic'
action against parties not directly involved in a given dispute ....
[Wihere a boycott relates directly to the social and economic
concerns of the workers involved in either or both of the original
dispute and the secondary action, and where the original dispute
and the secondary action are not unlawful in themselves, then
243. See FELICE MORGENSTERN, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS OF LABOUR LAW
112-15 (1984).
244. Id. at 114.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 115.
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that boycott should be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the
right to strike.
24 7
Ironically, the very mechanisms that induce the
creation of multinational firms, mergers for instance, may
also provide openings for unions. In the case of Chrysler
workers in the United States, for example, can they now
strike to aid workers at a Daimler-Benz factory in Bavaria?
Many believe that Daimler-Chrysler involved a takeover
and not a merger, but in any event both sets of workers
labor for the same company. And then there are the
workers at Japan's Mitsubishi, of which Daimler Chrysler
now has a 34% controlling interest. That control was
exercised recently in the naming of Rolf Eckrodt, not a
typical Japanese name, as Mitsubishi's chief executive, in
order to turn the company's fortunes around.248
Pressure on one's own company in order to aid foreign
workers in the same firm may not be deemed secondary.
Thus, the definition of "neutral" takes on a new
significance. As technologies, systems, and parts are shared
by components of an international firm, the argument that
national borders are irrelevant to the definition of the
"primary" grows stronger. In many nations wholly owned
affiliates or subsidiaries are considered separate, "neutral"
firms for purposes of secondary boycott restrictions, but the
internationalization of firms in the same sector weakens
the argument for neutrality.2 49 There are only a few U.S.
cases dealing with the issue, most treating affiliates of the
same firm as "neutrals" for purposes of the NLRA. Active
unions may challenge such decisions, which are clearly
political rather than based on the language of the statute or
its legislative history.
Thus, the international merger of companies may
create openings for truly international labor solidarity. If
this does take place it will be an ironic but hardly
unprecedented occurrence. Labor history is filled with
thrust, counterthrust and the often unexpected effects of
those strategic moves. If capital in the 19th century, for
247. 1989 REP. OF THE COMM. OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF
CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS III pt. 4A, at 238; see also supra text
accompanying note 2; Swepston, supra note 22, at 186-90.
248. See Mitsubishi Says Charges Will Double Expected Loss, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2001, at W1.
249. See generally Atleson, Reflections, supra note 46.
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instance, moved from the "putting out" system, or use of
home workers, to factories at least partly to control labor,
the unexpected result was the formation of a group of
workers with common interests who could form a union. In
recent times, the efficiency-generated just-in-time
production process created a windfall for certain unions. In
the auto industry, for instance, strikes at particular GM
factories in the United States closed down factories in other
locales, just as a national strike against GM in Canada
quickly affected plants in the United States. 20 Finally,
many countries, especially the United States, now find
themselves with international workforces with personal ties
all over the world. The situation is hardly a new one for the
United States, but it has been some time since the
workforce was as immigrant based as it is at present.
B. Is There a Distinction Between Economic and Political
Strikes?
The attempt to distinguish the economic and political
concerns of unions rests on the misguided premise that
unions can represent the economic interests of workers
effectively without engaging in political activity. If this was
ever more than a myth, it is certainly not the case in a post
laissez-faire society in which government intervention and
regulation in most spheres of economic and social life is a
daily event.25'
The reason for considering the possibility of a
distinction between political and economic strikes is that
constitutional protections may protect political expression
even, arguably, when the speakers express themselves by
withholding their labor. Civil rights or consumer groups
may engage in boycott activity because they are protected
by some higher law like the Charter of Rights in Canada or
the U.S. Constitution, but it is nevertheless common to
treat labor action as quite different. It is certainly possible
to argue that all strikes are political as they often challenge
250. KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD 10 (1997).
251. Brian Etherington, Freedom of Association and Compulsory Union
Dues: Towards a Purposive Conception of a Freedom Not to Associate, 19
OTAWA L. REV. 1, 34 (1987).
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existing distributions of income, the validity of existing law,
and often involve appeals to the public."2
Generally, however, the law of many states begins with
the assumption that the objectives of the strike must be
legitimate, and most assume that these must relate to work
demands and the process of collective bargaining. German
law reflects the approach of many states. Since strikes are
legal only if their purpose is to arrive at a collective
agreement, it follows that political, secondary, and
sympathy strikes are illegal, although narrow exceptions
may exist.23 For instance, in response to a request for
support from dockworkers' unions in the British port strike
in 1970, German unions noted that it would be unlawful for
them to engage in a sympathy boycott.5 4 Weiss notes that
this position has been challenged on the ground that
collective bargaining is only one device for regulating labor
relations, and it may becoming less important than state
regulation. 5
Some countries, Austria and the Netherlands, for
example, apply a principle called "proportionality" or
"reasonableness" to solidarity actions, permitting pressure
against firms dealing with the primary firm but not against
other companies not involved in the labor dispute. In
France, Italy, and Spain, where the right to strike is
constitutionally protected, it is usually said that solidarity
actions are allowable so long as workers have a community
of interest with those workers engaged in the primary
dispute.25
252. See generally Cynthia Eslund, What Do Workers Want? Employee
Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression under the National Labor
Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (1991).
253. See David Westfall & Gregor Thusing, Strikes and Lockouts in
Germany and Under Federal Legislation in the United States: A Comparative
Analysis, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 29, 45-48 (1999). See Weiss, Federal
Republic, supra note 238, at 173-74; MANFRED WEISS, LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GERMANY 155-56 (1995); GUNTER HALBACH ET AL.,
LABOUR LAW IN GERMANY: AN OVERVIEW 1, 322-34 (1994).
254. See K.W. Wedderburn, Industrial Relations, in NATIONALISM AND THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 244, 252 (H.R. Hahlo et al. eds., 1973); see also
Berndt von Maydell, The Concept of Political Strikes in Germany and
International Labour Law, in LABOUR LAW AT THE CROSSROADS: CHANGING
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 107 (Janice Bellace & Max Rood eds., 1997); KAHN-
FREUND, supra note 198, at 31-32.
255. See Weiss, Federal Republic, supra note 238, at 174.
256. See generally LANCE A. COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM
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Yet, it is not uncommon for strike demands to have
wider social or economic objectives. First, in a political
strike, the effort is "not directed against the employer but
rather against the state. Acceptance of the strikers'
demands by the state will result in changing government
policy or amending legislation, and will not be expressed in
signing a collective agreement. 25 7 The pressure is felt by the
employer, although it is not in a position to grant the
demands.
The difficulty in separating political from economic
strikes is shown in the Italian experience. Traditionally the
distinction existed, and political strikes were unlawful
either because they did not fall under conventional notions
of a strike defined as pressure focused upon workers'
specific economic interests, or because a political strike was
thought not to be within constitutionally protected strike
purposes. Decisions of the Constitutional Court in the
1960s, however, broadened the notion of the "economic" to
include all strikes designed to defend workers' interests,
relying upon an extensive list of interests expressly listed in
the Constitution. Thus, a strike for basic social reforms
would be lawful.
Still, the notion of some "pure" type of political strike
persists, e.g., one aimed at a general political direction or
orientation. But the Italian court rejected the notion of an
objective distinction between an economic and a political
strike as untenable, "much in the same way as in the
present state of our society it is impossible to separate
economic and political decisions, since there is in fact no
area of economic activity, and consequently of workers'
interests, not affected by politics and vice versa."258
Similarly, a 1962 decision of the Constitutional Court made
clear that solidarity strikes were legitimate so long as there
was sufficient community of interest between the two
worker groups, a legal approach giving broad discretion to
the courts.
259
OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS (Cynthia Brown ed., 2000).
257. Ben-Israel, supra note 239, at 51-56.
258. See T. Trev, Italy, in 8 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 216 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2002).
259. Id. at 217.
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The argument for broad right to engage in solidarity
actions starts with the most central, internationally
recognized, right of workers-freedom of association. The
ILO, for example, has established special procedures and
committees to review complaints about its violation and,
indeed, recognizes that freedom of association has a unique
status among the basic human rights it recognizes:
It is a prerequisite for progress towards social justice; it enables
the workers to give expression to their aspirations; it strengthens
their position in collective bargaining, by reestablishing a balance
in the strength of the parties; it constitutes a healthy
counterweight to the power of the State, by enabling labor to
participate in the framing and carrying out of economic and social
policies; and, last but not least, it is essential for the proper
functioning of an organization like the ILO based on tripartism,
that is to say cooperation on an equal footing between workers,
employers, and governments.26 °
More generally, the ILO has traditionally stated thatjustice as well as rationality supports the adoption of and
enforcement of labor standards such as freedom of
association. Thus, Raymond Torres states that the right to
organize and bargain collectively
is an essential element of success in the global economy. Trade
unions, collective bargaining and tripartite dialogue are necessary
elements for creating an environment that encourages innovation
and higher productivity, attracts FDI and enables societies and
economies to adjust to external shocks, such as financial crises and
natural disasters.
26 1
Ironically, however, the right to strike is not explicitly
expressed in the ILO constitution or in such important ILO
conventions as numbers 87 or 98. Despite this absence, the
right is understood in various ILO conventions to be basic,
and this would suggest that the right to strike applies to
solidarity actions taken in one nation to aid workers in
another. ILO Convention 87 recognizes the right of
260. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS: A
WORKERS' EDUCATION MANUAL109 (1998).
261. TORRES, supra note 49, at 64.
262. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 2, at 2-5; see also Gernigon et al.,
supra note 170, at 441-45 (1998); Keith Ewing, Ten Years of Progress?, 9 INT'L
UNION RTS. J. 14 (2002).
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national trade union to affiliate with international
organizations of workers and confederations also have
rights to freedom of association.263
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
considers the right to strike "a basic right," but it has noted
that it "seemed to have been taken for granted" in the
discussions which led to ILO Convention 87.64 Despite the
lack of explicitness regarding the right to strike in ILO
documents, both the ILO Committee of Experts and the
Committee on Freedom of Association have created a
considerable body of law by implication from a number of
articles in Convention 87, and deem the right "one of the
essential means available to workers and their
organizations for the promotion of their social and economic
interests." '265
Furthermore, the Freedom of Association Committee
has taken a broad view of the scope of the right, including
even sit-ins, slowdowns, and work to rule efforts so long as
they are peaceful.266  Nevertheless, the Committee
recognized that the right to strike cannot be considered an
absolute right. A general prohibition is improper, however,
except in cases of acute national crisis and only then for
limited periods. Moreover, the right should only be
restricted for military and police forces and, perhaps, for
other essential services affecting public health and safety.
263. See id. at 14.
264. See id. at 62-64. The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the
European Union includes many rights relevant to labor, and Article 28 includes
the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements, and for workers, "in
cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their ifiterests,
including strike action." The use of "conflicts of interests" following the right to
engage in bargaining may arguably limit the right to disputes with particular
employers, although the reference to "interests" could be read more broadly.
265. ANTHONY FORSYTH, TRADE UNION RIGHTS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 9
(1988); see also Breen Creighton, The ILO and the Internationalisation of
Australian Labour Law, 11 INT'L J. COMP. LAB. L. & IND. REL. 199, 208 (1995);
Swepston, supra note 22, at 186-90.
The right to strike has been expressly recognized in regional human rights
documents and bodies. The European Social Charter of 1961 included the first
express protection for the right to strike in a human rights document. Such
recognition, however, in documents such as the European Union's Community
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, is limited by domestic law. See COMPA, supra
note 256, at 40-50.
266. See Gernigon et al., supra note 170, at 444.
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As for political strikes, the Committee "has stated that
strikes that are purely political in character do not fall
within the scope of freedom of association."267 But the
Committee noted it is often difficult to distinguish between
the political aspects of a strike and those that directly
involve the working conditions of striking workers. The
Committee of Experts has also recognized workers' rights to
criticize government policy, and noted that legitimate
worker concerns go beyond securing better working
conditions or collective work claims, but also involve
advocating for solutions to social and economic problems:
In the view of the Committee, organizations responsible for
defending workers' socio-economic and occupational interests
should, in principle, be able to use strike action to support their
position in the search for solution to problems posed by major
social and economic policy trends which have a direct impact on
their members and on workers in general, in particular as regards
employment, social protection and the standard of living.
Thus, the Committee on Freedom of Association has
stated that banning or declaring illegal a national strike in
protest of a government's economic policies and their social
and labor consequences would constitute a serious violation
of freedom of association. Moreover, the Committee
declared legitimate a 24-hour general strike seeking an
increase in the minimum wage, respect for collective
agreements in force, and a change in economic policy.
269
Unsurprisingly, this has proved to be a controversial
position, and "[i]n all countries strikes which are purely
267. See id. at 446. Tonia Novitz believes that European jurisprudence and
ILO committee decisions tend to consider sympathy strikes and secondary
action legitimate, although strikes against government policies are protected,
but only when directed to collective bargaining issues. TONIA NOVITZ,
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF TH RIGHT TO STRIKE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STANDARDS SET BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 287-97,
347-48 (2003).
268. See id. at 445-47.
269. See RUTH BEN-ISRAEL, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS: THE CASE OF
FREEDOM TO STRIKE 96-98 (1988); Gernigon et al., supra note 170, at 446. Keith
Ewing assumes that Convention 87 "impliedly protects [both] the right to strike
generally" and the right of trade unions to take industrial actions in support of
workers in another country. Ewing, supra note 262, at 33. Nevertheless, Ewing
advocates a clearer statement that international solidarity actions are protected
by international law. Id.
170 [Vol. 52
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political in nature are in principle considered as
unlawful.""27 Many countries believe that such strikes might
"affect the system of representative democracy or the
competence of the constitutional bodies, especially where
their mode of expression endangers the sovereignty of
public institutions and prevents them from freely
evaluating the request advanced by other groups. ' Yet,
some countries have permitted political strikes for short
durations, and many have wrestled with the fact that
political and occupational aspects may be intertwined in a
specific dispute. While Japan, Belgium, and the United
Kingdom have pronounced such political strikes
illegitimate, Italy, Spain, France, Israel, and the
Netherlands have generally recognized them at least so
long as they involve defense of worker interests.7 2
The right to strike in France, for example, includes
actions in "defense of the workers' occupational interests,
and the admixture of political objectives is accepted, but to
a different degree in civil and criminal courts."273 In Italy,
the constitutional right to strike does not extend to "purely"
political strikes, but political strikes are not automatically
illegal. In 1974, provisions of the penal code were declared
unconstitutional "in so far as they penalized 'a political
strike not aimed at subverting constitutional order nor at
hindering or obstructing the free exercise of the legal
270. A. T. J. M. Jacobs, The Law of Strikes and Lockouts, in COMPARATIVE
LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES
423, 431. Despite these conclusions, unions have been known to strike or
threaten to strike in opposition to government proposals or policies. See
generally The Return of Trade Unions, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1993, at 53.
Political strikes do occur without public response, reflecting a reluctance to
enforce existing curbs in some situations. Recently, for instance, dockers across
Europe struck to protest a European Union directive which aims to privatize
ports and engender competition. The United Kingdom's port industry is almost
completely private but often the owner of the port is also the only terminal
operator. Almost all ports on the continent are publicly owned although they
often rent facilities to private companies. See generally Europe View:
Deregulation for Ports at Last, J. COM., Nov. 7, 2001. European Industrial
Relations Observatory Online, Strike Action in Ports Over Proposed Directive, at
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2003/10/inbrief/grO310lOln.html (last visited
Mar. 24, 2004).
271. See A. T. J. M. Jacobs, The Law of Strikes and Lockouts, supra note
270, at 431.
272. See id. at 432.
273. WEDDERBURN, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, supra note 127, at 285-89.
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powers in which popular sovereignty is expressed.' ,,274 Such
strikes are granted a "liberty" under the labor laws, while
the full right to strike applies to "strikes in pursuit of
'politico-economic' demands ...""'
On the other hand, one might distinguish domestic and
internationally focused disputes on the ground that other
channels to affect the labor policies of transnational firms
are not available. "A greater international solidarity of
workers should be developed and this could be a good
argument for allowing political industrial action when
ordinary channels are not available."27 The same, of course,
may be said for the foreign control of a local firm over which
local entities, state or union, may have few channels to
exert political or social pressure. Trade unions have few
avenues to influence international capital, yet it is clear
that capital can influence national labor law.2 7
C. Is the Right to Strike a Fundamental Human Right?
Should strikes which aim at supporting workers
elsewhere be deemed to involve basic rights, protected
either by constitutions or, as in Canada, the Charter of
Rights? The question is why the withholding of labor is not
deemed as basic a human right as the right to persuade
consumers not to purchase products. Picketing or
handbilling consumers causes, or at least is intended to
cause, economic harm, and the refusal to work is certainly
protected in other situations. As noted above, workers who
cease work on, for instance, certain "hot goods" can be said
to have a dispute with their own employer, and they are
expressing deeply held views about the solidarity of labor.
274. See id. at 49.
275. See id. at 285-86.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 253-54.
Indeed, one of the clear effects of globalization is the connecting of global
forces and labor and employment legislation and policy. One poignant example
was the call by COSATU, the militant South African union, for a general strike
and national demonstrations in May, 2000 against private sector job losses and
the refusal of businesses to reinvest in the country, although the dispute is also
focused on government policies such as tariff reductions and job losses at state
owned facilities. COSATU noted that socio-economic strikes were protected by
section 77 of South Africa's Labour Relations Act. E-mail from press@icftu.org
to James Atleson, Professor of Law, University at Buffalo (May 9, 2000) (on file
with author).
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In a passing reference, the U.S. Supreme Court
remarked that there is no absolute constitutional right to
strike. 278 This statement is often relied upon in the United
States to explain why the right to withhold labor is not part
of the liberty interest enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.
This counterargument is certainly rational, but it will likely
be deemed exceedingly naive to even raise such a question.
Again, the state cannot constitutionally bar my civic group
from picketing or handbilling. And in the United States,
unions have a right to engage in even secondary
handbilling-although not picketing-because the Court
thought the opposite result under the NLRA would raise
serious constitutional issues. The question, therefore, is
why the interest in striking to protect or augment
workplace protections and benefits does not fall within the
First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. A strike involves
collective action and the withholding of labor, appearing
rationally to trigger the liberty interest protected by the
U.S. Constitution as well as the basic documents of other
nations. If the "right to carry on business" is often deemed
protected, why not the right of workers to seek to improve
the conditions under which they work? The courts have
recognized the freedom of even public sector workers to
organize unions as part of the freedom of association, and
the issue is whether that freedom should encompass the
right to strike as well. "A union that never strikes, or which
278. "Neither the common law, nor the Fourteenth Amendment, confers the
absolute right to strike." Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926). The
Kansas statute upheld by a unanimous Court made it a crime to induce
employees to quit their employment for the purpose and with the intent to
hinder, delay, limit or suspend the operation of mining. Dorchy, vice-president
of a local union of the United Mine Workers of America, was convicted for
calling a strike designed to force a mine company to pay a disputed claim to a
former worker. The Court, via Justice Brandeis, stated that the right to carry
on business had value, and it was unlawful to interfere with this right "without
just cause." Id. The Court then held that an intent to collect a "stale claim due
to a fellow member of the union who was formerly employed in the business is
not a permissible purpose." Id. A court was the proper forum to decide the
claim, but "[tlo enforce payment by a strike is clearly coercion." Id.
For an imaginative argument that the Thirteenth Amendment can be
employed to protect the right to organize, see James G. Pope, The First
Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Right to Organize in the
Twenty-first Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 941 (1999).
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can make no credible threat to strike, may wither away in
ineffectiveness. 279
Finally, in analyzing whether labor rights should be
considered human rights, what accounts for the
assumptions in restrictive legal systems which permit
strikes over wages or working conditions but bar the
withholding of. labor for other reasons, e.g., to protest
working conditions elsewhere or to assist workers
embroiled in a dispute in another company or nation?
Secondary or sympathetic actions have been restricted by
U.S. courts, except for a brief period in the 20th century, on
the grounds that such actions unduly widened a labor
dispute, involved others without an interest in the dispute,
or unfairly pressured neutral employers and employees.
Each of these justifications has serious weaknesses, and, I
suspect, contains a judicial fear of class-based action. In any
event, it seems to me that the right to withhold one's labor
is entitled to great respect, and the traditional labor
concern for not working on "hot" goods is arguably as
worthy as striking to improve wages or the right to
distribute leaflets or even to picket consumers.
There are, of course, many nations which do protect the
freedom of association, to form labor unions, and some even
constitutionally protect the right to strike. Such
recognition, however, would not at all mean that strikes
would receive more protection than in states only
recognizing such actions legislatively. Indeed, as Bob
Hepple has noted, by making such rights fundamental and
constitutionally enforceable "we shift the resolution of
disputes from the political and industrial spheres to the
sphere of public lawyers and the judiciary."28 The concern,
of course, is that judges will interpret the law, whether
legislative or constitutional, according to their own value
systems, informed by property and individualistic notions
embedded in the common law.28 ' Where the state
279. United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 885 (D.D.C.
1971) (Wright, J., concurring), affd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971); see also County
Sanitation Dist. 2 v. L.A. County Employees Ass'n, Local 660, 699 P. 2d 8355
(holding that it is not unlawful for public employees to engage in concerted
work stoppage for the purpose of employment unless it is determined that the
work stoppage poses an imminent threat to public health or safety), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985).
280. Bob Hepple, The Future of Labour Law, 24 IND. L.J. 303, 319-20 (1995).
281. See generally Atleson, Confronting Judicial Values, supra note 128.
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participates in the setting of labor law ground rules,
however, no resolution of this problem has yet been
discovered. Critically necessary to the recognition and
protection of labor rights are vibrant, militant unions, and
perhaps a new vocabulary that "treats workers as a
valuable, organic part of the enterprise, as long-term
participants with a .valuable investment and citizenship
stake in the operation."
282
Michael Eisenscher has noted that, although
international solidarity is not guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution per se,
it is nevertheless a universal human right which can not be
'granted' by government, although it can be recognized and
sanctioned, as for instance by the International Labor
Organization and various UN conventions. It is founded on bonds
forged between workers across national borders by the kinship of
labor. It is an extension of the bonds of human interdependence.
To deny my right to express solidarity with workers down the
street or in another land is to deny my place within the human
family. It deprives me of my humanity. I refuse to recognize or
accept the power of any court or government to deny me claim to
these bonds that transcend nationality, race, ethnicity, religion,
and politics. If the Bill of Rights were abolished tomorrow, I would
still claim a right to demonstrate in solidarity with workers in
struggle, whether here or in Liverpool. 283
CONCLUSION
The very pressures that are inducing the creation of
transnational firms may provide openings for unions, albeit
based domestically. For instance, assume Chrysler workers
in the United States strike to aid workers at a Daimler-
Benz factory in Bavaria. Pressure against one's own
company in order to aid foreign workers in the same firm
may not be deemed secondary, and, thus, the definition of
"neutral" takes on a new significance. As technology, parts,
and production systems are shared by subsidiaries of
international firms, the argument that national borders are
irrelevant to the definition of the "primary" grows stronger.
282. See id. at 455-56.
283. E-mail from Michael Eisenscher, to James Atleson, Professor of Law,
University at Buffalo (May 8, 1998) (on file with author).
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In many nations wholly owned affiliates or subsidiaries are
considered separate firms for purposes of secondary boycott
restrictions, but the internationalization of firms in the
same sector weakens the argument for neutrality.2 "4
Moreover, as Charles Levinson has noted, "[i]f it is legally
permissible for a foreign parent company directly to control
and decide on management policy from abroad, then it
should be equally permissible for workers to act together
with other workers of the same company abroad in their
common interests without it being held to be an illegal
sympathy strike or secondary boycott."285
Thus the international merger of companies may create
the opening for truly international labor solidarity. If so, it
will lead to an ironic, but hardly unprecedented situation.
Labor history is filled with thrust and counterthrust and
the often unexpected effects of those efforts. If capital in the
19th century, for instance, moved from home-based
production to factories at least partly to control labor, the
unexpected' result was the formation of a group of workers
with common interests who could form a union. In recent
times, the efficiency-generated just-in-time production
process created a windfall for certain unions. In the auto
industry, for instance, strikes at particular GM factories in
the United States closed down factories in other locales,
and, similarly, a national strike against GM in Canada
quickly affected plants in the United States.8 6
Globalization may create a more "international" worker,
aware of common interests with workers in other counties.
The possible "internationalization" of unions, however, will
confront obstacles of domestic labor law. In some cases
arguments may be made that the firm against which
pressure is being placed is not wholly neutral, that it is ano
integrated part of a larger corporation against which a
foreign union has a dispute. Unions might attempt to argue
that a refusal to work on "hot cargo" is not secondary action
at all; instead, the refusal is motivated by personal or moral
values. Arguments may also be made, especially in the case
of political strikes, that traditional assumptions do not
apply when the focus of concern extends beyond a nation's
284. See, e.g., CHARLES LEVINSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNIONISM 111
(1972); Atleson, Reflections, supra note 46.
285. See LEVINSON, supra note 284, at 111.
286. See MOODY, supra note 55, at 10.
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borders. The scope of domestic legal restrictions on
sympathy strikes will be affected by the actions and
resulting litigation. Further, unions may attempt to directly
challenge statutory and judicial prohibitions by arguing
that the choice of protecting an allegedly neutral company
denigrates a valuable human right, the right to withhold
one's labor in aid of others. The right to withhold labor is
entitled to great respect, and the traditional labor concern
for not working on "hot" goods is as worthy of protection as
striking to improve wages.
Finally, worker action may place the issue of labor
rights in the forefront. Labor standards are proposed by the
ILO but granted and enforced, if at all, by governments.
Unions have a political role, obviously, in lobbying for
standards, and a collective role in enforcing them. Labor
rights, however, even those recognized in international
documents must be won by collective action.8 7
Nevertheless, the apparent necessity for transnational
union cooperation should not disguise the difficulty of
seeking and obtaining this goal, even aside from the legal
difficulties described above. Differences of culture,
language, and history provide serious obstacles to
cooperation, joined with differences in labor law and the
extent of development, and it is far from clear that
international solidarity will arise from the global labor
market.2 8  Moreover, non-U.S. unions may well be
suspicious of the ultimate aims of U.S. unions. Broader
concerns may exist. For instance, national unions may fear
the loss of autonomy and the possible costs of supporting
workers elsewhere. Just as serious are the barriers by
TNEs themselves, the difficulty of discovering accurate
information about TNEs and, of course, their powerful
opposition to international collaboration or solidarity.
Some of the problems can be seen by considering two
unions, the Canadian Automobile Workers' Union ("CAW")
and United Automobile Workers' Union ("UAW") in the
United States, which seem to have strong common
interests. For instance, to a considerable degree there is a
287. I am indebted to William Tabb for this idea. See WILLIAM K. TABB, THE
AMORAL ELEPHANT: GLOBALIZATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 194 (2001).
288. See generally George Ross, Labor Versus Globalization, ANNALS
AMERICAN AcAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 78 (2000).
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hemispheric auto market, reflected in the Canadian-United
States automobile pact and the fact that the Big Three
automakers have plants throughout the hemisphere. Asian
auto makers like Toyota and Honda have achieved
substantial market penetration in the hemisphere, and
these firms have established plants within the borders of
the three NAFTA countries as well as in countries in South
America. In addition, each union is concerned about the
threat of layoffs and plant closings in their respective
countries due to subcontracting or "outsourcing,"
downsizing or because of the transfer of production toplants in other countries. Moreover, each union is troubled
by the practice of inducing union locals to compete with
each other for work. In a competition that need not respect
borders, the companies are free to seek concessions or
beneficial arrangements from locals in different plants in
exchange for provision of new work or maintenance of prior
production.
Another concern of both unions is the tendency of the
auto firms, especially General Motors recently, to spin off
parts factories as independent firms. These plants then
compete for production contracts with non-union parts
manufacturers. Moreover, various auto plants have recently
engaged in a form of "in-sourcing." Both GM and
Volkswagen in Brazil, for instance, have recently placed
employees of suppliers, or subcontractors, on the assembly
plant floor so that workers in the same plants will have
different wage and benefit packages and some will not be
unionized.
Finally, local strikes in the United States, for instance,
in Flint, Michigan, idled thousands of workers throughout
the United States and Canada, once again demonstrated
the potential of cross-border labor strategies. The
automakers' "just in time" strategy, ironically, has made
them more susceptible to local strikes while, at the same
time, purely domestic disputes routinely have transnational
impacts.
On the other hand, the concern of each union for
maintaining jobs and facilities creates sources of possible
inter-union conflict. First, there are the historical sources of
tension between the CAW and the UAW. The two
automobile workers' unions have functioned separately
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since the Canadian branch of the U.S. union broke away
from the UAW."5 9 Institutionally, the causes of the breakup
may well be relevant to the possibility of joint action by the
two unions.
Recently, however, the Presidents of the CAW and
UAW have cautiously expressed some interest in exploring
ways to work more closely together. Since the companies
the unions deal with operate in a continental as well as
global market, and disputes in one country have effects in
the other, there is a growing interest in rethinking purely
national bargaining arrangements.
All of this, of course, does not mean that the unions-or
companies or governments-necessarily favor transnational
bargaining, not least because workers, suppliers,
communities, states and provinces and countries are all in
competition for production facilities and for the jobs and
taxes which they generate. Workers in different countries
may well see foreign workers as competitors, as part of "the
problem." Historically, after all, unions have been national
in structure.29 ° Nevertheless, if unions like the two
autoworkers' unions are serious about closer coordination,
they will have to confront the serious problems created by
domestic laws.
The perception that labor must focus globally as well as
nationally is obviously based upon the closer integration of
economies. We do seem to be faced with a new phase of
capitalism, where all the world is a stage, or at least more
of a stage than ever before. Free market ideology
dominates, although there is evidence of growing resistance
all over the globe. But we should not treat the existence of
global movement of capital as completely new or
responsible for all the travails of workers around the globe.
This means, also, that we should resist assuming that
global forces are the source of all of labor's plight, for the
effects of global capital on children, women, and all workers
are not completely unprecedented.
Indeed, global corporations and international
movement of capital are not at all a new phenomenon. As
289. See generally J. Holmes & A. Rusonik, The Break-up of an
International Labour Union: Uneven Development in the North American Auto
Industry and the Schism in the UAW, 23 ENVT & PLAN. 9 (1991).
290. See Harry Arthurs, The New Economy and the Demise of Industrial
Citizenship (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Karl Marx noted in 1848, "[tlhe need of a constantly
expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie
over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle
everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections
everywhere."291  The East India and Hudson Bay
corporations, although perhaps heavily under the sway of
the British government, existed for several centuries. And a
good deal ,of land development in the United States colonies
was accomplished by corporations seeking immigrants to
increase the value of land."' Moreover, the search for
cheaper workers, whether located domestically or
elsewhere, is nothing new. New England workers in the
shoe manufacturing and textile industries, for example,
faced unemployment in the latter part of the 19th and early
20th centuries when firms moved to the southern United
States.
I concede, however, that the power of TNEs seems to
have markedly increased, affecting the lives of millions of
workers. Trade and foreign investment, as well, play a
larger role in the world's economic activity than they did in
the past. Kim Moody notes, for instance, that the United
Nations "estimates that TNEs accounted for two-thirds of
the value of all exports by 1993. Half of this, or one-third of
total world trade, was intra-firm trade; that is, cross-border
transactions between affiliates of the same corporation."293
Despite significant increases in foreign investment and
the growth of manufacturing in the "south," the distribution
of wealth between the north and south has not changed for
the better over the years. The wealthiest countries of the
north still produce the largest portion of the world's
production and absorb or consume most of its investment
and trade.
Similarly, neither the movement of workers across
national boundaries nor the reasons people leave their
homelands are unprecedented. The use of guest workers in
Europe or the Middle East is not a new phenomenon, of
course. Moreover, as Bernard Bailyn has demonstrated, the
great migration to the United States in the 17th and 18th
291. MOODY, supra note 55, at 44 (quoting KARL MARX, MANIFESTO OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY 13 (1943)).
292. Suggested to me by my colleague, Fred Konefsky.
293. MOODY, supra note 55, at 48.
180 [Vol. 52
NEPTUNE JADE
centuries reflected the movement of workers from place to
place in Europe, and finally to North America.294
Detailed analyses of immigrants around the world find
that differences in wage rates do not correlate positively
with reasons for immigration. Indeed, workers are
generally leaving developing areas and cities, areas of rapid
growth, not poor, agricultural areas. Instead, workers are
seeking capital and families are seeking ways to diversify
their income sources to reduce economic risks. 9
Finally on this point, discussions of the new workforce
tend to omit the fact that, at least in the United States, a
workforce made up of recent immigrants with different
languages, religion, and cultures parallels the situation in
many U.S. industries in the early part of the 20th century.
International labor solidarity activists should also be
prepared for the possibility that labor activity or social
clauses in future trade agreements will ameliorate the often
appalling conditions in many workplaces around the world
to a more limited extent than is often believed. For
instance, many of the workers now toiling in terrible
conditions, including sweat shops in the first world like the
United States, work for domestic, not international,
markets. Attaching labor rights to international trade
agreements may not help all the workers that should be
aided, although, like the minimum wage, there may be
some generalized benefit.
Moreover, many of the world's workplaces are
populated by workers who have limited choices. Diane Wolf
294. More recently, analysis of immigration to the United States in the
early part of this century reveals that, up to World War I, about half or more of
immigrants wanted to return to their homelands. More surprisingly, 40 to 50%
actually did. See GABRIEL KOLKO, MAIN CURRENTS IN MODERN AMERICAN
HISTORY 68-72 (1976).
295. Douglas Massey stated that:
Studies consistently show that international migrants do not come
from poor, isolated places that are disconnected from world markets,
but from regions and nations that are undergoing rapid change and
development as a result of their incorporation into global trade,
information, and production networks. In the short run, international
migration does not stem from a lack of economic development but from
development itself.
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN MOTION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 277 (1998).One hypothesis,
therefore, is that pacts like NAFTA will actually increase undocumented
immigration into the United States. See Id. at 277-80.
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has discussed women factory workers in rural Java. Women
workers, she found, worked for less than subsistence wages
because they said they wanted money of their own to buy
things like their own soap, they thought their status would
be enhanced because the work would be cleaner and cooler
than agricultural work, they could leave their parents'
homes, and they could meet young men. Interestingly, these
workers moved to factories for the same reason women
traveled in the 19th century to places like Lowell,
Massachusetts: to acquire some income, get away from
agricultural work and their families, find a husband, and
acquire some modern, hip belongings.296 Importantly, a
large number of workers like these, including child laborers
around the globe, work in industries that produce for the
domestic market.
Despite the many obstacles to transnational solidarity
efforts, sympathetic and secondary labor activity across
national borders may well increase. Recent struggles
suggest that even the restraints of domestic law may not
hinder collective activity that seems reasonable, supportive
or just self interested. Ironically, global capital may help to
create the global worker as the right to engage in cross-
border solidarity action is seen as the correlative to the
global free movement of capital. These clashes of interests
will highlight the often uneasy rationales for legal
restrictions on the right to use one's labor to support others.
Appendix
SAGA OF THE NEPTUNE JADE297
The British crown thought Namibia would best remain unfree
But the British dockers went on strike in solidarity
So the docks were privatized and the workers they were fired
296. See generally THOMAS DUBLIN, WOMEN AT WORK: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF WORK AND COMMUNITY IN LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS 1826-60 (1979).
297. Ellen Starbird, The Saga of the Neptune Jade (1997), available at
http://www. iww.org/iu510/jade/jadel9.shtml (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
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And the Neptune Jade was loaded by the scabs they newly hired
The Bosses thought the Oakland Union would not interfere
A no strike, no picket contract stops disruption there!
But Laney students picketed the docks to the Neptune Jade's
dismay
And retirees joined the picket, kept the scab cargo at bay, sayin'
CHORUS:
Set sail, set sail, Oh, Neptune Jade, you will not anchor here.
You can travel round the globe with your cargo in the hold.
But you will not unload here!
Set sail, set sail, oh Neptune Jade! You might as well stand clear.
Till the lads reinstate, we won't unload your freight. No
you needn't anchor here!
Bosses said, "You Oakland stevedores can easily push by
those schoolgirls picketing your docks," but the stevedores just
smiled
Sayin' "An Injury to One is an Injury to All!"
"It's a health and safety issue boys, we're back to the union hall!"
CHORUS
The court sided with the bosses, the cargo to unload
"Striking workers can be fired!," Oakland dockers they were told
The Labor Party took the picketing up on day number two
And the dockers swore that they were just too ornry to get through
The Oakland PMA dock bosses just could not believe
That community supporters could have them so stymied
The point of cutting workers up by nationality
Is to determine their rights if they don't show unity
CHORUS
The picketing in Oakland was by day and night I'm told
Berth fees were racking up, cargo rotting in her hold
The Liverpool dock bosses saw they would not get their way
So they set out on day four for the San Francisco Bay
Well the Frisco dockers told 'em, "Don't even bother here.
We have lost wages now in then over many of these years
Refusing to unload to stop apartheid, genocide.
You can't buy a stevedore, with a day's wages for his pride."
CHORUS
So the ship went to Vancouver, its cargo to unload
But likewise there the dockers turned the pay down cold
Not a cargo box was altered when the Pacific too was crossed
At Yokohama and Kobe, Japan the Neptune Jade was lost.
The Neptune Jade's in anchor now, her cargo in her hold.
You can buy her for a song in Hong Kong's port I'm told.
But if you use her to bust unions, race baiting even worse
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Name her the Flying Dutchman, and hear everywhere this curse:
CHORUS
THE BALLAD OF THE NEPTUNE JADE
298
Sailed into Oakland on a Sunday morn
Moored at the dockside blowin her horn
But the Captain's lookin a bit forlorn
There's a picket of the Neptune Jade
The company say we gotta cross the line
Took us to the courtroom 4 more times
Singing "time is money and the money's all mine
So get them boxes movin"
Midnight Tuesday she was in a spin
Sailed around the Bay tried to come back again
But the picket was holding and we wouldn't go in
We're a longshore union
The Neptune Jade's had a change of name
She's the Flying Dutchman once again
Hapag Lloyd must be insane
To call in Liverpool
Headed up to Canada lookin for a berth
Thamesport's screaming for all that they are worth
On Saturday the picket brought them down to earth
Vancouver's in the union
So sail around the world with your hot cargo
Order us to scab and we'll say no
Dockers of the world are set to blow
We're all from Liverpool
298. The Ballad of the Neptune Jade (1998), available at
http://www.iww.org iu510/jade/jade10.shtml (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
